|
[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH for-4.12 v2 8/8] xen: Switch parameter in get_page_from_gfn to use typesafe gfn
On 20/12/2018 19:23, Julien Grall wrote:
> diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
> index 32dc4253ff..b462a8513b 100644
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
> @@ -827,7 +827,7 @@ int arch_set_info_guest(
> unsigned long flags;
> bool compat;
> #ifdef CONFIG_PV
> - unsigned long cr3_gfn;
> + gfn_t cr3_gfn;
I've sent an alternative patch which this patch should be rebased over,
at which point all modifications to arch_set_info_guest() should
hopefully disappear.
> diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/domain.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/domain.c
> index 5d5a746a25..73d2da8441 100644
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/domain.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/domain.c
> @@ -297,7 +297,7 @@ int arch_set_info_hvm_guest(struct vcpu *v, const
> vcpu_hvm_context_t *ctx)
> {
> /* Shadow-mode CR3 change. Check PDBR and update refcounts. */
> struct page_info *page = get_page_from_gfn(v->domain,
> - v->arch.hvm.guest_cr[3] >> PAGE_SHIFT,
> + gaddr_to_gfn(v->arch.hvm.guest_cr[3]),
> NULL, P2M_ALLOC);
Can you re-indent while modifying this please?
> diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/viridian/time.c
> b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/viridian/time.c
> index 840a82b457..a718434456 100644
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/viridian/time.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/viridian/time.c
> @@ -38,16 +38,16 @@ static void dump_reference_tsc(const struct domain *d)
>
> static void update_reference_tsc(struct domain *d, bool initialize)
> {
> - unsigned long gmfn = d->arch.hvm.viridian.reference_tsc.fields.pfn;
> - struct page_info *page = get_page_from_gfn(d, gmfn, NULL, P2M_ALLOC);
> + gfn_t gfn = _gfn(d->arch.hvm.viridian.reference_tsc.fields.pfn);
> + struct page_info *page = get_page_from_gfn(d, gfn, NULL, P2M_ALLOC);
> HV_REFERENCE_TSC_PAGE *p;
>
> if ( !page || !get_page_type(page, PGT_writable_page) )
> {
> if ( page )
> put_page(page);
> - gdprintk(XENLOG_WARNING, "Bad GMFN %#"PRI_gfn" (MFN %#"PRI_mfn")\n",
> - gmfn, mfn_x(page ? page_to_mfn(page) : INVALID_MFN));
> + gdprintk(XENLOG_WARNING, "Bad GFN %#"PRI_gfn" (MFN %#"PRI_mfn")\n",
The canonical format for gfns and mfns are just %"PRI_*, without the #
Do you mind fixing this seeing as you're changing the string anyway?
> diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/p2m.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/p2m.h
> index 3304921991..1efbc071c5 100644
> --- a/xen/include/asm-x86/p2m.h
> +++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/p2m.h
> @@ -491,18 +491,21 @@ struct page_info *p2m_get_page_from_gfn(struct
> p2m_domain *p2m, gfn_t gfn,
> p2m_query_t q);
>
> static inline struct page_info *get_page_from_gfn(
> - struct domain *d, unsigned long gfn, p2m_type_t *t, p2m_query_t q)
> + struct domain *d, gfn_t gfn, p2m_type_t *t, p2m_query_t q)
> {
> struct page_info *page;
> + mfn_t mfn;
>
> if ( paging_mode_translate(d) )
> - return p2m_get_page_from_gfn(p2m_get_hostp2m(d), _gfn(gfn), t, NULL,
> q);
> + return p2m_get_page_from_gfn(p2m_get_hostp2m(d), gfn, t, NULL, q);
>
> /* Non-translated guests see 1-1 RAM / MMIO mappings everywhere */
> if ( t )
> *t = likely(d != dom_io) ? p2m_ram_rw : p2m_mmio_direct;
> - page = mfn_to_page(_mfn(gfn));
> - return mfn_valid(_mfn(gfn)) && get_page(page, d) ? page : NULL;
> +
> + mfn = _mfn(gfn_x(gfn));
> + page = mfn_to_page(mfn);
> + return mfn_valid(mfn) && get_page(page, d) ? page : NULL;
This unfortunately propagates some bad behaviour, because it is not safe
to use mfn_to_page(mfn); before mfn_valid(mfn) succeeds. (In practice
it works because mfn_to_page() is just pointer arithmetic.)
Pleas can you express this as:
return (mfn_valid(mfn) &&
(page = mfn_to_page(mfn), get_page(page, d))) ? page : NULL;
which at least gets the order of operations in the correct order from
C's point of view.
Alternatively, and perhaps easier to follow:
if ( !mfn_valid(mfn) )
return NULL;
page = mfn_to_page(mfn);
return get_page(page, d) ? page : NULL;
~Andrew
_______________________________________________
Xen-devel mailing list
Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
|
![]() |
Lists.xenproject.org is hosted with RackSpace, monitoring our |