[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v4 2/2] xen/blkback: rework connect_ring() to avoid inconsistent xenstore 'ring-page-order' set by malicious blkfront
On 01/07/2019 10:05 PM, Dongli Zhang wrote: > > > On 01/07/2019 08:01 PM, Roger Pau Monné wrote: >> On Mon, Jan 07, 2019 at 01:35:59PM +0800, Dongli Zhang wrote: >>> The xenstore 'ring-page-order' is used globally for each blkback queue and >>> therefore should be read from xenstore only once. However, it is obtained >>> in read_per_ring_refs() which might be called multiple times during the >>> initialization of each blkback queue. >>> >>> If the blkfront is malicious and the 'ring-page-order' is set in different >>> value by blkfront every time before blkback reads it, this may end up at >>> the "WARN_ON(i != (XEN_BLKIF_REQS_PER_PAGE * blkif->nr_ring_pages));" in >>> xen_blkif_disconnect() when frontend is destroyed. >>> >>> This patch reworks connect_ring() to read xenstore 'ring-page-order' only >>> once. >>> >>> Signed-off-by: Dongli Zhang <dongli.zhang@xxxxxxxxxx> >>> --- >>> Changed since v1: >>> * change the order of xenstore read in read_per_ring_refs >>> * use xenbus_read_unsigned() in connect_ring() >>> >>> Changed since v2: >>> * simplify the condition check as "(err != 1 && nr_grefs > 1)" >>> * avoid setting err as -EINVAL to remove extra one line of code >>> >>> Changed since v3: >>> * exit at the beginning if !nr_grefs >>> * change the if statements to avoid test (err != 1) twice >>> * initialize a 'blkif' stack variable (refer to PATCH 1/2) >>> >>> drivers/block/xen-blkback/xenbus.c | 76 >>> +++++++++++++++++++++----------------- >>> 1 file changed, 43 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-) >>> >>> diff --git a/drivers/block/xen-blkback/xenbus.c >>> b/drivers/block/xen-blkback/xenbus.c >>> index a4aadac..a2acbc9 100644 >>> --- a/drivers/block/xen-blkback/xenbus.c >>> +++ b/drivers/block/xen-blkback/xenbus.c >>> @@ -926,7 +926,7 @@ static int read_per_ring_refs(struct xen_blkif_ring >>> *ring, const char *dir) >>> int err, i, j; >>> struct xen_blkif *blkif = ring->blkif; >>> struct xenbus_device *dev = blkif->be->dev; >>> - unsigned int ring_page_order, nr_grefs, evtchn; >>> + unsigned int nr_grefs, evtchn; >>> >>> err = xenbus_scanf(XBT_NIL, dir, "event-channel", "%u", >>> &evtchn); >>> @@ -936,43 +936,38 @@ static int read_per_ring_refs(struct xen_blkif_ring >>> *ring, const char *dir) >>> return err; >>> } >>> >>> - err = xenbus_scanf(XBT_NIL, dev->otherend, "ring-page-order", "%u", >>> - &ring_page_order); >>> - if (err != 1) { >>> - err = xenbus_scanf(XBT_NIL, dir, "ring-ref", "%u", >>> &ring_ref[0]); >>> + nr_grefs = blkif->nr_ring_pages; >>> + >>> + if (unlikely(!nr_grefs)) >>> + return -EINVAL; >> >> Is this even possible? AFAICT read_per_ring_refs will always be called >> with blkif->nr_ring_pages != 0? >> >> If so, I would consider turning this into a BUG_ON/WARN_ON. > > It used to be "WARN_ON(!nr_grefs);" in the v3 of the patch. > > I would turn it into WARN_ON if it is fine with both Paul and you. To clarify, I would use WARN_ON() before exit with -EINVAL (when blkif->nr_ring_pages is 0). Dongli Zhang > > I prefer WARN_ON because it would remind the developers in the future that > read_per_ring_refs() should be used only when blkif->nr_ring_pages != 0. > >> >>> + >>> + for (i = 0; i < nr_grefs; i++) { >>> + char ring_ref_name[RINGREF_NAME_LEN]; >>> + >>> + snprintf(ring_ref_name, RINGREF_NAME_LEN, "ring-ref%u", i); >>> + err = xenbus_scanf(XBT_NIL, dir, ring_ref_name, >>> + "%u", &ring_ref[i]); >>> + >>> if (err != 1) { >>> - err = -EINVAL; >>> - xenbus_dev_fatal(dev, err, "reading %s/ring-ref", dir); >>> - return err; >>> - } >>> - nr_grefs = 1; >>> - } else { >>> - unsigned int i; >>> - >>> - if (ring_page_order > xen_blkif_max_ring_order) { >>> - err = -EINVAL; >>> - xenbus_dev_fatal(dev, err, "%s/request %d ring page >>> order exceed max:%d", >>> - dir, ring_page_order, >>> - xen_blkif_max_ring_order); >>> - return err; >>> + if (nr_grefs == 1) >>> + break; >>> + >> >> You need to either set err to EINVAL before calling xenbus_dev_fatal, >> or call xenbus_dev_fatal with EINVAL as the second parameter. >> >>> + xenbus_dev_fatal(dev, err, "reading %s/%s", >>> + dir, ring_ref_name); >>> + return -EINVAL; >>> } >>> + } >>> >>> - nr_grefs = 1 << ring_page_order; >>> - for (i = 0; i < nr_grefs; i++) { >>> - char ring_ref_name[RINGREF_NAME_LEN]; >>> - >>> - snprintf(ring_ref_name, RINGREF_NAME_LEN, "ring-ref%u", >>> i); >>> - err = xenbus_scanf(XBT_NIL, dir, ring_ref_name, >>> - "%u", &ring_ref[i]); >>> - if (err != 1) { >>> - err = -EINVAL; >>> - xenbus_dev_fatal(dev, err, "reading %s/%s", >>> - dir, ring_ref_name); >>> - return err; >>> - } >>> + if (err != 1) { >>> + WARN_ON(nr_grefs != 1); >>> + >>> + err = xenbus_scanf(XBT_NIL, dir, "ring-ref", "%u", >>> + &ring_ref[0]); >>> + if (err != 1) { >>> + xenbus_dev_fatal(dev, err, "reading %s/ring-ref", dir); >> >> Second parameter should be EINVAL, or err should be set to EINVAL >> before calling xenbus_dev_fatal. >> >> Thanks, Roger. >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Xen-devel mailing list >> Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx >> https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel >> > > Dongli Zhang > _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
|
Lists.xenproject.org is hosted with RackSpace, monitoring our |