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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 3/6] x86/AMD: Rework XSA-9 / Erratum 121 handling entirely
>>> On 28.12.18 at 13:39, <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> There are multiple problems:
>
> * The opt_allow_unsafe < 0 logic is dead since 2012 (c/s 0c7a6966511
> "x86-64: refine the XSA-9 fix").
Not really, no, the more that said commit only introduced it. Please
pay attention to the description saying "by means of a single line
change" as well as "don't default to boot denial". The thing I agree
was not possible (no idea how I did overlook it) was to set the
value to -1 without it defaulting to it.
> * Given that opt_allow_unsafe was deliberately intended not to be
> specific to #121 alone, setting it to true for the not-affected case
> will cause a security issue if a second use of this option ever
> appears.
> * Calling cpu_has_amd_erratum() on every domain creation is wasteful,
> given that the answer is static after boot.
Hardly a big performance impact, I would say.
> Move opt_allow_unsafe into domain.c, as a better location for it to
> live, and switch it to be a straight boolean.
So you think boot denial is not useful, and hence not worthwhile to
retain (and make properly command line controllable)?
> @@ -538,6 +534,14 @@ static void init_amd_k8(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
> {
> uint64_t val;
>
> + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_BUG_AMD_ERRATUM_121);
> + printk(KERN_WARNING
> + "*** Xen will not allow DomU creation on this CPU for
> security reasons ***\n"
> + KERN_WARNING
> + "*** Pass \"allow_unsafe\" if you trust all your guest
> kernels ***\n");
This would affect all of Fam0F, while models 0x40 and higher aren't
affected from all I know.
Jan
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