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Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 4/4] xen/x86: Allow stubdom access to irq created for msi.



On Wed, Jan 16, 2019 at 05:57:04AM -0700, Jan Beulich wrote:
> >>> On 16.01.19 at 13:20, <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > Do you think it makes sense to add a domctl to enable/disable MSI(X)?
> 
> A domctl looks odd for an operation like this; I'd rather consider
> adding a physdevop if a new (sub)hypercall is needed here (of
> which I'm not yet convinced; I have yet to look at the patch).

I suggested a domctl because this operation would be performed by
control domains, not by unprivileged guests themselves, much like
XEN_DOMCTL_{un}bind_pt_irq. Also it won't be a stable interface, and
we could get rid of it in the future if we change the way passthrough
works (ie: by using vpci for guests also).

But I see your point about making it a physdevop, that would seem like
the best fit context wise.

Thanks, Roger.

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