[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]
Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v3 07/11] optee: add support for RPC SHM buffers
Hi Volodymyr,
On 18/12/2018 21:11, Volodymyr Babchuk wrote:
From: Volodymyr Babchuk <vlad.babchuk@xxxxxxxxx>
OP-TEE usually uses the same idea with command buffers (see
previous commit) to issue RPC requests. Problem is that initially
it has no buffer, where it can write request. So the first RPC
request it makes is special: it requests NW to allocate shared
buffer for other RPC requests. Usually this buffer is allocated
only once for every OP-TEE thread and it remains allocated all
the time until shutdown.
By shutdown you mean for the OS or the thread?
Mediator needs to pin this buffer(s) to make sure that domain can't
transfer it to someone else.
Life cycle of this buffer is controlled by OP-TEE. It asks guest
to create buffer and it asks it to free it.
Signed-off-by: Volodymyr Babchuk <vlad.babchuk@xxxxxxxxx>
---
Changes from v2:
- Added check to ensure that guests does not return two SHM buffers
with the same cookie
- Fixed coding style
- Storing RPC parameters during RPC return to make sure, that guest
will not change them during call continuation
xen/arch/arm/tee/optee.c | 140 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 138 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/tee/optee.c b/xen/arch/arm/tee/optee.c
index dc90e2ed8e..771148e940 100644
--- a/xen/arch/arm/tee/optee.c
+++ b/xen/arch/arm/tee/optee.c
@@ -30,6 +30,12 @@
* OP-TEE spawns a thread for every standard call.
*/
#define MAX_STD_CALLS 16
+/*
+ * Maximal number of pre-allocated SHM buffers. OP-TEE generally asks
+ * for one SHM buffer per thread, so this also corresponds to OP-TEE
+ * option CFG_NUM_THREADS
+ */
Same as patch #6 regarding CFG_NUM_THREADS.
NIT: Missing full stop
+#define MAX_RPC_SHMS MAX_STD_CALLS
#define OPTEE_KNOWN_NSEC_CAPS OPTEE_SMC_NSEC_CAP_UNIPROCESSOR
#define OPTEE_KNOWN_SEC_CAPS (OPTEE_SMC_SEC_CAP_HAVE_RESERVED_SHM | \
@@ -47,12 +53,22 @@ struct optee_std_call {
int optee_thread_id;
int rpc_op;
bool in_flight;
+ register_t rpc_params[2];
+};
+
+/* Pre-allocated SHM buffer for RPC commands */
+struct shm_rpc {
+ struct list_head list;
+ struct page_info *guest_page;
+ uint64_t cookie;
};
/* Domain context */
struct optee_domain {
struct list_head call_list;
+ struct list_head shm_rpc_list;
atomic_t call_count;
+ atomic_t shm_rpc_count;
spinlock_t lock;
};
@@ -108,7 +124,11 @@ static int optee_enable(struct domain *d)
}
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ctx->call_list);
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ctx->shm_rpc_list);
+
atomic_set(&ctx->call_count, 0);
+ atomic_set(&ctx->shm_rpc_count, 0);
+
spin_lock_init(&ctx->lock);
d->arch.tee = ctx;
@@ -227,11 +247,90 @@ static void put_std_call(struct optee_domain *ctx, struct
optee_std_call *call)
spin_unlock(&ctx->lock);
}
+static struct shm_rpc *allocate_and_pin_shm_rpc(struct optee_domain *ctx,
+ paddr_t gaddr,
As I said on v3, I would prefer if you use gfn_t here. This would introduce more
safety.
+ uint64_t cookie)
+{
+ struct shm_rpc *shm_rpc, *shm_rpc_tmp;
+ int count;
+
+ /* Make sure that guest does not allocate more than MAX_RPC_SHMS */
NIT: Missing full stop.
+ count = atomic_add_unless(&ctx->shm_rpc_count, 1, MAX_RPC_SHMS);
+ if ( count == MAX_RPC_SHMS )
+ return NULL;
+
+ shm_rpc = xzalloc(struct shm_rpc);
+ if ( !shm_rpc )
+ goto err;
+
+ /* This page will be shared with OP-TEE, so we need to pin it */
Ditto.
+ shm_rpc->guest_page = get_page_from_gfn(current->domain,
+ paddr_to_pfn(gaddr),
+ NULL,
+ P2M_ALLOC);
I think it would be wrong to share any page other than p2m_ram_rw with OP-TEE.
+ if ( !shm_rpc->guest_page )
+ goto err;
+
+ shm_rpc->cookie = cookie;
+
+ spin_lock(&ctx->lock);
+ /* Check if there is already SHM with the same cookie */
"already a SHM"
NIT: Missing full stop.
+ list_for_each_entry( shm_rpc_tmp, &ctx->shm_rpc_list, list )
+ {
+ if ( shm_rpc_tmp->cookie == cookie )
+ {
+ spin_unlock(&ctx->lock);
+ gprintk(XENLOG_WARNING, "Guest tries to use the same RPC SHM
cookie");
I would use gdprintk(...) and add the cookie number for debug.
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ list_add_tail(&shm_rpc->list, &ctx->shm_rpc_list);
+ spin_unlock(&ctx->lock);
+
+ return shm_rpc;
+
+err:
+ atomic_dec(&ctx->shm_rpc_count);
+ put_page(shm_rpc->guest_page);
+ xfree(shm_rpc);
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static void free_shm_rpc(struct optee_domain *ctx, uint64_t cookie)
+{
+ struct shm_rpc *shm_rpc;
+ bool found = false;
+
+ spin_lock(&ctx->lock);
+
+ list_for_each_entry( shm_rpc, &ctx->shm_rpc_list, list )
+ {
+ if ( shm_rpc->cookie == cookie )
+ {
+ found = true;
+ list_del(&shm_rpc->list);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ spin_unlock(&ctx->lock);
I think you are missing an atomic_dec(&ctx->shm_rpc_count) here.
+
+ if ( !found )
+ return;
+
+ ASSERT(shm_rpc->guest_page);
+ put_page(shm_rpc->guest_page);
+
+ xfree(shm_rpc);
+}
+
static void optee_domain_destroy(struct domain *d)
{
struct arm_smccc_res resp;
struct optee_std_call *call, *call_tmp;
struct optee_domain *ctx = d->arch.tee;
+ struct shm_rpc *shm_rpc, *shm_rpc_tmp;
/* At this time all domain VCPUs should be stopped */
@@ -247,7 +346,11 @@ static void optee_domain_destroy(struct domain *d)
list_for_each_entry_safe( call, call_tmp, &ctx->call_list, list )
free_std_call(ctx, call);
+ list_for_each_entry_safe( shm_rpc, shm_rpc_tmp, &ctx->shm_rpc_list, list )
+ free_shm_rpc(ctx, shm_rpc->cookie);
+
ASSERT(!atomic_read(&ctx->call_count));
+ ASSERT(!atomic_read(&ctx->shm_rpc_count));
xfree(d->arch.tee);
}
@@ -356,6 +459,8 @@ static void execute_std_call(struct optee_domain *ctx,
optee_ret = get_user_reg(regs, 0);
if ( OPTEE_SMC_RETURN_IS_RPC(optee_ret) )
{
+ call->rpc_params[0] = get_user_reg(regs, 1);
+ call->rpc_params[1] = get_user_reg(regs, 2);
call->optee_thread_id = get_user_reg(regs, 3);
call->rpc_op = OPTEE_SMC_RETURN_GET_RPC_FUNC(optee_ret);
put_std_call(ctx, call);
@@ -408,6 +513,33 @@ err:
return false;
}
+static void handle_rpc_func_alloc(struct optee_domain *ctx,
+ struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
+{
+ paddr_t ptr = get_user_reg(regs, 1) << 32 | get_user_reg(regs, 2);
+
+ if ( ptr & (OPTEE_MSG_NONCONTIG_PAGE_SIZE - 1) )
+ gprintk(XENLOG_WARNING, "Domain returned invalid RPC command
buffer\n");
Should not you bail-out in that case? Also, I would turn it to a gdprintk.
+
+ if ( ptr )
+ {
+ uint64_t cookie = get_user_reg(regs, 4) << 32 | get_user_reg(regs, 5);
+ struct shm_rpc *shm_rpc;
+
+ shm_rpc = allocate_and_pin_shm_rpc(ctx, ptr, cookie);
+ if ( !shm_rpc )
+ {
+ gprintk(XENLOG_WARNING, "Failed to allocate shm_rpc object\n");
+ ptr = 0;
+ }
+ else
+ ptr = page_to_maddr(shm_rpc->guest_page);
+
+ set_user_reg(regs, 1, ptr >> 32);
+ set_user_reg(regs, 2, ptr & 0xFFFFFFFF);
+ }
+}
+
static bool handle_rpc(struct optee_domain *ctx, struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
{
struct optee_std_call *call;
@@ -421,11 +553,15 @@ static bool handle_rpc(struct optee_domain *ctx, struct
cpu_user_regs *regs)
switch ( call->rpc_op )
{
case OPTEE_SMC_RPC_FUNC_ALLOC:
- /* TODO: Add handling */
+ handle_rpc_func_alloc(ctx, regs);
break;
case OPTEE_SMC_RPC_FUNC_FREE:
- /* TODO: Add handling */
+ {
+ uint64_t cookie = call->rpc_params[0] << 32 |
+ (uint32_t)call->rpc_params[1];
The indentation looks weird here.
+ free_shm_rpc(ctx, cookie);
break;
+ }
case OPTEE_SMC_RPC_FUNC_FOREIGN_INTR:
break;
case OPTEE_SMC_RPC_FUNC_CMD:
Cheers,
--
Julien Grall
_______________________________________________
Xen-devel mailing list
Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
|
