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Re: [Xen-devel] SpectreV1+L1TF Patch Series


  • To: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@xxxxxxxx>
  • From: Juergen Gross <jgross@xxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 11:01:53 +0100
  • Autocrypt: addr=jgross@xxxxxxxx; prefer-encrypt=mutual; keydata= xsBNBFOMcBYBCACgGjqjoGvbEouQZw/ToiBg9W98AlM2QHV+iNHsEs7kxWhKMjrioyspZKOB ycWxw3ie3j9uvg9EOB3aN4xiTv4qbnGiTr3oJhkB1gsb6ToJQZ8uxGq2kaV2KL9650I1SJve dYm8Of8Zd621lSmoKOwlNClALZNew72NjJLEzTalU1OdT7/i1TXkH09XSSI8mEQ/ouNcMvIJ NwQpd369y9bfIhWUiVXEK7MlRgUG6MvIj6Y3Am/BBLUVbDa4+gmzDC9ezlZkTZG2t14zWPvx XP3FAp2pkW0xqG7/377qptDmrk42GlSKN4z76ELnLxussxc7I2hx18NUcbP8+uty4bMxABEB AAHNHkp1ZXJnZW4gR3Jvc3MgPGpncm9zc0BzdXNlLmRlPsLAeQQTAQIAIwUCU4xw6wIbAwcL CQgHAwIBBhUIAgkKCwQWAgMBAh4BAheAAAoJELDendYovxMvi4UH/Ri+OXlObzqMANruTd4N zmVBAZgx1VW6jLc8JZjQuJPSsd/a+bNr3BZeLV6lu4Pf1Yl2Log129EX1KWYiFFvPbIiq5M5 kOXTO8Eas4CaScCvAZ9jCMQCgK3pFqYgirwTgfwnPtxFxO/F3ZcS8jovza5khkSKL9JGq8Nk czDTruQ/oy0WUHdUr9uwEfiD9yPFOGqp4S6cISuzBMvaAiC5YGdUGXuPZKXLpnGSjkZswUzY d9BVSitRL5ldsQCg6GhDoEAeIhUC4SQnT9SOWkoDOSFRXZ+7+WIBGLiWMd+yKDdRG5RyP/8f 3tgGiB6cyuYfPDRGsELGjUaTUq3H2xZgIPfOwE0EU4xwFgEIAMsx+gDjgzAY4H1hPVXgoLK8 B93sTQFN9oC6tsb46VpxyLPfJ3T1A6Z6MVkLoCejKTJ3K9MUsBZhxIJ0hIyvzwI6aYJsnOew cCiCN7FeKJ/oA1RSUemPGUcIJwQuZlTOiY0OcQ5PFkV5YxMUX1F/aTYXROXgTmSaw0aC1Jpo w7Ss1mg4SIP/tR88/d1+HwkJDVW1RSxC1PWzGizwRv8eauImGdpNnseneO2BNWRXTJumAWDD pYxpGSsGHXuZXTPZqOOZpsHtInFyi5KRHSFyk2Xigzvh3b9WqhbgHHHE4PUVw0I5sIQt8hJq 5nH5dPqz4ITtCL9zjiJsExHuHKN3NZsAEQEAAcLAXwQYAQIACQUCU4xwFgIbDAAKCRCw3p3W KL8TL0P4B/9YWver5uD/y/m0KScK2f3Z3mXJhME23vGBbMNlfwbr+meDMrJZ950CuWWnQ+d+ Ahe0w1X7e3wuLVODzjcReQ/v7b4JD3wwHxe+88tgB9byc0NXzlPJWBaWV01yB2/uefVKryAf AHYEd0gCRhx7eESgNBe3+YqWAQawunMlycsqKa09dBDL1PFRosF708ic9346GLHRc6Vj5SRA UTHnQqLetIOXZm3a2eQ1gpQK9MmruO86Vo93p39bS1mqnLLspVrL4rhoyhsOyh0Hd28QCzpJ wKeHTd0MAWAirmewHXWPco8p1Wg+V+5xfZzuQY0f4tQxvOpXpt4gQ1817GQ5/Ed/wsDtBBgB CAAgFiEEhRJncuj2BJSl0Jf3sN6d1ii/Ey8FAlrd8NACGwIAgQkQsN6d1ii/Ey92IAQZFggA HRYhBFMtsHpB9jjzHji4HoBcYbtP2GO+BQJa3fDQAAoJEIBcYbtP2GO+TYsA/30H/0V6cr/W V+J/FCayg6uNtm3MJLo4rE+o4sdpjjsGAQCooqffpgA+luTT13YZNV62hAnCLKXH9n3+ZAgJ RtAyDWk1B/0SMDVs1wxufMkKC3Q/1D3BYIvBlrTVKdBYXPxngcRoqV2J77lscEvkLNUGsu/z W2pf7+P3mWWlrPMJdlbax00vevyBeqtqNKjHstHatgMZ2W0CFC4hJ3YEetuRBURYPiGzuJXU pAd7a7BdsqWC4o+GTm5tnGrCyD+4gfDSpkOT53S/GNO07YkPkm/8J4OBoFfgSaCnQ1izwgJQ jIpcG2fPCI2/hxf2oqXPYbKr1v4Z1wthmoyUgGN0LPTIm+B5vdY82wI5qe9uN6UOGyTH2B3p hRQUWqCwu2sqkI3LLbTdrnyDZaixT2T0f4tyF5Lfs+Ha8xVMhIyzNb1byDI5FKCb
  • Cc: Tim Deegan <tim@xxxxxxx>, Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx>, Wei Liu <wei.liu2@xxxxxxxxxx>, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@xxxxxxxxxx>, George Dunlap <George.Dunlap@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>, Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Dario Faggioli <dfaggioli@xxxxxxxx>, Martin Pohlack <mpohlack@xxxxxxxxx>, Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxx>, David Woodhouse <dwmw@xxxxxxxxxxxx>, "Martin Mazein\(amazein\)" <amazein@xxxxxxxxx>, xen-devel <xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Julian Stecklina <jsteckli@xxxxxxxxx>, Bjoern Doebel <doebel@xxxxxxxxx>, Norbert Manthey <nmanthey@xxxxxxxxx>
  • Delivery-date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 10:02:05 +0000
  • List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xenproject.org>
  • Openpgp: preference=signencrypt

On 28/01/2019 10:56, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>> On 28.01.19 at 09:47, <jgross@xxxxxxxx> wrote:
>> On 28/01/2019 09:28, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>>>> On 23.01.19 at 12:51, <nmanthey@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>>> This patch series attempts to mitigate the issue that have been raised in 
>>>> the
>>>> XSA-289 (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-289.html). To block 
>>>> speculative
>>>> execution on Intel hardware, an lfence instruction is required to make sure
>>>> that selected checks are not bypassed. Speculative out-of-bound accesses 
>>>> can
>>>> be prevented by using the array_index_nospec macro.
>>>>
>>>> The lfence instruction should be added on x86 platforms only. To not affect
>>>> platforms that are not affected by the L1TF vulnerability, the lfence
>>>> instruction is patched in via alternative patching on Intel CPUs only.
>>>> Furthermore, the compile time configuration allows to choose how to 
>>>> protect the
>>>> evaluation of conditions with the lfence instruction.
>>>
>>> I've noticed only now that you weren't Cc-ed on this series. It
>>> clearly is something to at least be considered for 4.12. May I
>>> ask what your view on this is? Perhaps in particular whether
>>> you would want to set some boundary in time until which pieces
>>> of it (as they become ready, which looks to be the case for
>>> patches 10 and 11 at this point in time) may go in?
>>
>> I'd say until RC3 they are fine to go in when ready. After that I'd like
>> to decide on a case-by-case basis.
> 
> May I interpret this as a release ack for patches 10 and 11 of
> v4 then, and perhaps even generally as such an ack for other
> parts of the series (with the RC3 boundary in mind)?

Yes.


Juergen


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