[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH for-4.12 2/8] amd/ntp: remove assert that prevents creating 2M MMIO entries
>>> On 05.02.19 at 14:38, <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > On Tue, Feb 05, 2019 at 05:44:14AM -0700, Jan Beulich wrote: >> >>> On 05.02.19 at 11:40, <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >> > On Tue, Feb 05, 2019 at 12:45:56AM -0700, Jan Beulich wrote: >> >> >>> On 04.02.19 at 18:18, <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >> >> > On Mon, Feb 04, 2019 at 09:56:22AM -0700, Jan Beulich wrote: >> >> >> >>> On 30.01.19 at 11:36, <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >> >> >> > The assert was originally added to make sure that higher order >> >> >> > regions (> PAGE_ORDER_4K) could not be used to bypass the >> >> >> > mmio_ro_ranges check performed by p2m_type_to_flags. >> >> >> > >> >> >> > This however is already checked in set_mmio_p2m_entry, which makes >> >> >> > sure that higher order mappings don't overlap with mmio_ro_ranges, >> >> >> > thus allowing the creation of high order MMIO mappings safely. >> >> >> >> >> >> Well, the assertions were added to make sure no other code >> >> >> path appears that violates this requirement. Arguably e.g. >> >> >> set_identity_p2m_entry() could gain an order parameter and >> >> >> then try to establish larger p2m_mmio_direct entries. >> >> >> >> >> >> Don't get me wrong, I don't object to the removal of the >> >> >> assertions, but the description makes it sound as if they were >> >> >> entirely redundant. Even better would be though if they >> >> >> could be extended to keep triggering in "bad" cases. >> >> > >> >> > I could add something like: >> >> > >> >> > ASSERT(!rangeset_overlaps_range(mmio_ro_ranges, mfn_x(mfn), >> >> > mfn_x(mfn) + PFN_DOWN(MB(2)))); >> >> > >> >> > I think this should be safe and would trigger in case of misuse. >> >> >> >> Looks okay, if slightly extended (or made conditional) to exclude >> >> the addition of MB(2) to MFN_INVALID to wrap and potentially >> >> hit a r/o range in the low 1Mb. >> > >> > Ack, so it would be: >> > >> > ASSERT(mfn_eq(mfn, INVALID_MFN) || >> > !rangeset_overlaps_range(mmio_ro_ranges, mfn_x(mfn), >> > mfn_x(mfn) + PFN_DOWN(MB(2)))); >> >> But that's still dropping the other aspect of the original ASSERT(): >> >> >> >> > --- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-pt.c >> >> >> > +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-pt.c >> >> >> > @@ -668,7 +668,6 @@ p2m_pt_set_entry(struct p2m_domain *p2m, gfn_t >> >> >> > gfn_, > mfn_t mfn, >> >> >> > } >> >> >> > >> >> >> > ASSERT(p2m_flags_to_type(flags) != p2m_ioreq_server); >> >> >> > - ASSERT(!mfn_valid(mfn) || p2mt != p2m_mmio_direct); >> >> It also made sure that "valid" MFNs can't be used for mappings with >> p2m_mmio_direct type. Except that I realize now that this is wrong in >> certain cases, because MMIO pages may actually have "valid" MFNs. >> mfn_valid(), after all, only tells us whether there's a struct page_info >> for the MFN. I wonder if it's really this brokenness that you hit, >> rather than what is explained in the description. >> >> When the assertion was introduced, MMIO wasn't handled by the >> code correctly anyway (!mfn_valid() MFNs would not have got any >> mappings at all in the 2M and 1G paths), whereas now we have >> p2m_allows_invalid_mfn() there. So the situation has become worse >> with other nearby changes. As a result I think we want to correct >> the assertion here alongside the addition of what you suggest >> above. What about >> >> if ( p2mt != p2m_mmio_direct ) >> ASSERT(mfn_valid(mfn) || (mfn_eq(mfn, INVALID_MFN) && >> p2m_allows_invalid_mfn(p2mt))); >> else >> ASSERT(!mfn_eq(mfn, INVALID_MFN) && >> !rangeset_overlaps_range(mmio_ro_ranges, mfn_x(mfn), >> mfn_x(mfn) + PFN_DOWN(MB(2)))); > > I would write it as 'if ( p2mt == p2m_mmio_direct ) ... else ...' but > apart from that LGTM. If you are fine with this adjustment I will > change it in preparation for v2. Oh, sure - what's if and what's else doesn't really matter here. You could even use ?: inside the ASSERT() if you wanted to. Jan _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
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