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Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] x86/HVM: correctly deal with benign exceptions when combining two



>>> On 06.02.19 at 10:57, <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On 06/02/2019 07:40, Jan Beulich wrote:
>> Benign exceptions, no matter whether they're first or second, will never
>> cause #DF (a benign exception being second can basically only be #AC, as
>> in the XSA-156 scenario).
> 
> #DB can happen as well, but I'm not sure if this example is relevant
> here.  Both of those loops where repeated exceptions caused by trying to
> deliver the first exception, rather than an issue of priority amongst
> simultaneous exceptions during the execution of an instruction.

No, I don't think #DB falls into this category (I had it here before
and then removed it): If a data breakpoint hits while delivering an
exception or interrupt, that - being a trap - will be delivered _after_
the original event, i.e. on the first instruction of the other handler.
That's also the way the XSA-156 advisory describes it.

> For VT-x, we're supposed to fill in the PENDING_DBG control rather than
> raise #DB directly, explicitly to allow the priority of interrupts to be
> expressed correctly.  There is a very large quantity of untangling
> working to do, and very clear I'm not going to have time to fix even the
> STI/Singlestep issue in the 4.12 timeframe.

Are you saying there need to be any vendor specific adjustments
to this function then? I would very much hope that the code here
could remain vendor independent, with vendor specific adjustments
done in vendor specific code, and independently of the proposed
change here.

>> Sadly neither AMD nor Intel really define what happens with two benign
>> exceptions - the term "sequentially" used by both is poisoned by how the
>> combining of benign and non-benign exceptions is described. Since NMI,
>> #MC, and hardware interrupts are all benign and (perhaps with the
>> exception of #MC) can't occur second, favor the first in order to not
>> lose it.
> 
> #MC has the highest priority so should only be recognised immediately
> after an instruction boundary.

Are you sure? What about an issue with one of the memory
accesses involved in delivering a previously raised exception?

>  The interesting subset is then a #DB
> from task switch, then NMI, then #DB from other pending traps from the
> previous instruction, so I think it is quite possible for us to end up
> with a #DB stacked on top of the head of the NMI/#MC handler, if we
> follow a sequential model.  (Lucky for XSA-260 then, if this case
> actually exists.)

But for that we'd first of all need callers of this function to
record the fact that their exception was squashed. Plus,
as per above, such a #DB is to be delivered after the one
that caused it to be raised in the first place, so is not subject
to the behavior of hvm_combine_hw_exceptions() itself, and
hence beyond the scope of this patch.

> I don't however see a way of stacking #AC, because you can't know that
> one has occured until later in the instruction cycle than all other
> sources.  What would happen is that you'd raise #AC from previous
> instruction, and then recognise #MC while starting to execute the #AC
> entry point.  (I think)

Well - see XSA-156 for what hardware does in that situation.
Besides eliminating that security issue, I don't think this is a
very important case to deal with correctly, unless you're aware
of OSes which allow handling #AC in ring 3.

Irrespective of all of the above - what am I to take from your
response? I.e. what adjustments (within the scope of this patch)
do you see necessary for the change to become acceptable? It
was my thinking that this change alone would have masked the
original #DF issue you've run into, so would likely be worthwhile
without any of the other related work you hint at.

Jan



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