[Xen-devel] SpectreV1+L1TF Patch Series v6

[Norbert Manthey <nmanthey@xxxxxxxxx>]

Dear all,

This patch series attempts to mitigate the issue that have been raised in the
XSA-289 (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-289.html). To block speculative
execution on Intel hardware, an lfence instruction is required to make sure
that selected checks are not bypassed. Speculative out-of-bound accesses can
be prevented by using the array_index_nospec macro.

The major changes between v5 and v6 of this series are the introduction of
asm specific nospec.h files that introduce macros to add lfence instructions
to conditionals to be evaluated. Furthermore, updating variable that might
not be located in a register is tried to be avoided.

Best,
Norbert




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