[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v4.1 4/6] xen/x86: Allow stubdom access to irq created for msi.
On Thu, Mar 07, 2019 at 01:50:04AM +0100, Marek Marczykowski-Górecki wrote: > On Fri, Feb 22, 2019 at 11:42:22AM +0100, Roger Pau Monné wrote: > > On Thu, Feb 21, 2019 at 06:40:40PM +0100, Marek Marczykowski-Górecki wrote: > > > On Thu, Feb 21, 2019 at 05:47:51PM +0100, Roger Pau Monné wrote: > > > > On Fri, Feb 08, 2019 at 11:17:05AM +0100, Marek Marczykowski-Górecki > > > > wrote: > > > > > { > > > > > int irq, ret; > > > > > struct irq_desc *desc; > > > > > @@ -190,19 +190,19 @@ int create_irq(nodeid_t node) > > > > > desc->arch.used = IRQ_UNUSED; > > > > > irq = ret; > > > > > } > > > > > - else if ( hardware_domain ) > > > > > + else if ( dm_domain ) > > > > > > > > Can you guarantee that dm_domain is always current->domain? > > > > > > No, in some cases it will be hardware_domain. > > > > Right, but in that case current->domain == hardware_domain I guess? > > > > > > > > > I think you need to assert for this, or else take a reference to > > > > dm_domain (get_domain) before accessing it's fields, or else you risk > > > > the domain being destroyed while modifying it's fields. > > > > > > Can hardware_domain be destroyed without panicking Xen? If so, > > > get_domain would be indeed needed. > > > > What about other callers that are not the hardware_domain? You need to > > make sure those domains are not destroyed while {create/destroy}_irq > > is changing the permissions. > > > > If you can guarantee that dm_domain == current->domain then you are > > safe, if not you need to get a reference before modifying any fields > > of the domain struct. > > > > So IMO you either need to add an assert or a get_domain depending on > > the answer to the question above. > > I've added an assert, and I think I have the answer to the above question: > > (XEN) Assertion 'd == current->domain' failed at irq.c:232 > (XEN) ----[ Xen-4.12.0-rc x86_64 debug=y Not tainted ]---- > (XEN) CPU: 2 > (XEN) RIP: e008:[<ffff82d08028f545>] destroy_irq+0x126/0x143 > (XEN) RFLAGS: 0000000000010206 CONTEXT: hypervisor > (...) > (XEN) Xen call trace: > (XEN) [<ffff82d08028f545>] destroy_irq+0x126/0x143 > (XEN) [<ffff82d08028ce1e>] msi_free_irq+0x51/0x1b8 > (XEN) [<ffff82d0802923e1>] unmap_domain_pirq+0x487/0x4d4 > (XEN) [<ffff82d08029249f>] free_domain_pirqs+0x71/0x8f > (XEN) [<ffff82d0802819e0>] arch_domain_destroy+0x41/0xa1 > (XEN) [<ffff82d080207d22>] domain.c#complete_domain_destroy+0x86/0x159 > (XEN) [<ffff82d08022a658>] rcupdate.c#rcu_process_callbacks+0xa5/0x1cc > (XEN) [<ffff82d08023c4fa>] softirq.c#__do_softirq+0x78/0x9a > (XEN) [<ffff82d08023c566>] do_softirq+0x13/0x15 > (XEN) [<ffff82d080280532>] domain.c#idle_loop+0x63/0xb9 > > In this case, current->domain obviously isn't the stubdomain, because at > this point it is already destroyed (it keeps reference to the target > domain, so target domain couldn't be destroyed before its stubdomain). > > In fact, in this case get_dm_domain() returns wrong value, since it > isn't called by device model. At the point where stubdomain is already > destroyed, I think it should return NULL, but it returns > hardware_domain. But it isn't that easy, because target domain don't > have any reference to its stubdomain. Especially already destroyed one. > > I's defined as: > > static struct domain *get_dm_domain(struct domain *d) > { > return current->domain->target == d ? current->domain : > hardware_domain; > } So get_dm_domain works fine when used by create_irq, because in that case current->domain == d AFAICT. As you pointed out however using the same mechanism for destroy is not suitable, since the stubdomain might be already destroyed, and unmap_domain_pirq called from the idle vCPU. > Since hardware domain couldn't be destroyed(*) while the system is > running, in practice this wrong return value it isn't a problem. > Hardware didn't have permission over this IRQ (if stubdomain have > created it), so irq_deny_access is a no-op. > > So, I would adjust assert in destroy_irq to allow also hardware_domain, > and add a comment that get_dm_domain may return hardware_domain during > domain destruction. Is that ok? Hm, albeit I agree with your analysis, I feel like this proposed solution is kind of a workaround. Given the context, I think the best way to deal with this issue in destroy_irq is to iterate over the list of domains and make sure no domain has permissions over the destroyed irq. Note that with this proposed solution you will have to drop the domain parameter from destroy_irq. Another option would be to store which domains are given permissions over which irqs in a way that's optimized to get the list of domains given an irq (ie: without having to iterate over the list of domains like my proposed solution above). Thanks, Roger. _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
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