[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2] x86/hvm: finish IOREQ correctly on completion path
>>> On 12.03.19 at 17:23, <igor.druzhinin@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > Since the introduction of linear_{read,write}() helpers in 3bdec530a5 > (x86/HVM: split page straddling emulated accesses in more cases) the > completion path for IOREQs has been broken: if there is an IOREQ in > progress but hvm_copy_{to,from}_guest_linear() returns HVMTRANS_okay > (e.g. when P2M type of source/destination has been changed by IOREQ > handler) the execution will never re-enter hvmemul_do_io() where > IOREQs are completed. This usually results in a domain crash upon > the execution of the next IOREQ entering hvmemul_do_io() and finding > the remnants of the previous IOREQ in the state machine. > > This particular issue has been discovered in relation to p2m_ioreq_server > type where an emulator changed the memory type between p2m_ioreq_server > and p2m_ram_rw in process of responding to IOREQ which made hvm_copy_..() > to behave differently on the way back. But could be also applied > to a case where e.g. an emulator balloons memory to/from the guest in > response to MMIO read/write, etc. An emulator ballooning memory? I think Andrew was hinting towards another vCPU of the guest doing some ballooning work in parallel to the insn emulation. > @@ -1089,7 +1092,19 @@ static int linear_read(unsigned long addr, unsigned > int bytes, void *p_data, > uint32_t pfec, struct hvm_emulate_ctxt *hvmemul_ctxt) > { > pagefault_info_t pfinfo; > - int rc = hvm_copy_from_guest_linear(p_data, addr, bytes, pfec, &pfinfo); > + struct hvm_vcpu_io *vio = ¤t->arch.hvm.hvm_io; > + struct hvm_mmio_cache *cache = hvmemul_find_mmio_cache(vio, addr, > + IOREQ_READ, > false); const (and I wonder whether the local variable it worth it in the first place) > + int rc = HVMTRANS_bad_gfn_to_mfn; > + > + /* > + * If there is an MMIO cache entry for that access then we must be > re-issuing > + * an access that was previously handed as MMIO. Thus it is imperative > that ... handled ... ? > + * we handle this access in the same way to guarantee completion and > hence > + * clean up any interim state. > + */ > + if ( !cache ) > + rc = hvm_copy_from_guest_linear(p_data, addr, bytes, pfec, &pfinfo); This is certainly better than the previous version, but imo still doesn't address the general case. But I'd be willing to accept it as a temporary workaround for the specific case of a write to an (aligned) page table entry leading to a page type change from p2m_ioreq_server to p2m_ram_rw, as it at least doesn't seem to break the case anymore that the introduction of linear_{read,write}() was meant to address. The more general case that still won't work (afaict) is an access crossing a page boundary, where the second page's type changes behind our backs. The first part of the access won't find a cache entry here, and hence would still go the hvm_copy_{from,to}_guest_linear() path above. And then there's the more general issue with this caching using (only) guest (linear) addresses as tags: While thinking through the implications here, it became pretty obvious that hvmemul_phys_mmio_access() doing if ( dir == IOREQ_READ ) memcpy(&buffer[offset], &cache->buffer[offset], chunk); else if ( memcmp(&buffer[offset], &cache->buffer[offset], chunk) != 0 ) domain_crash(current->domain); will wrongly crash the domain if a single insn writes the same linear address more than once with different data. Such a case is pretty simple to construct with AVX512's scatter insns, but even without I'm not sure bad scenarios couldn't be found. Obviously in such a case your new use of the cached info is liable to go wrong, too, albeit possibly in a benign way. Hence this new use of caching that needs to go away (read: needs to be replaced) is at best sub-optimal, and may further complicate that future work. Jan _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
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