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[Xen-devel] Ping: [PATCH 0/4] x86: further L1TF / XSA-289 guards



>>> On 31.01.19 at 15:07,  wrote:
> This goes alongside Norbert's series, dealing with a few more
> places where I happened to know (without any analysis tools)
> guest controlled array accesses sit. I've additionally also
> checked emul-i8254.c, and I think no adjustments are needed
> there (there are a few possible overruns by one, but just like
> is the case in patch 2 I don't think they are actual issues).
> 
> 1: x86emul: avoid speculative out of bounds accesses

There was a v2 of this sent separately.

Jan

> 2: x86/vMSI: avoid speculative out of bounds accesses
> 3: x86/vPIC: avoid speculative out of bounds accesses
> 4: x86/vLAPIC: avoid speculative out of bounds accesses
> 
> Jürgen, I've copied you anyway, but I assume your general
> Rab-until-RC3 would apply to this series (and perhaps to
> further ones, should anyone find time) as much as to Norbert's.
> 
> Jan
> 
> 




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