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[Xen-devel] [PATCH v5 5/6] xen/x86: add PHYSDEVOP_msi_control



Allow device model running in stubdomain to enable/disable MSI(-X),
bypassing pciback. While pciback is still used to access config space
from within stubdomain, it refuse to write to
PCI_MSI_FLAGS_ENABLE/PCI_MSIX_FLAGS_ENABLE in non-permissive mode. Which
is the right thing to do for PV domain (the main use case for pciback),
as PV domain should use XEN_PCI_OP_* commands for that. Unfortunately
those commands are not good for stubdomain use, as they configure MSI in
dom0's kernel too, which should not happen for HVM domain.

This new physdevop is allowed only for stubdomain controlling the domain
which own the device.

Signed-off-by: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <marmarek@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
Changes in v3:
 - new patch
Changes in v4:
 - adjust code style
 - s/msi_msix/msi/
 - add msi_set_enable XSM hook
 - flatten struct physdev_msi_set_enable
 - add to include/xlat.lst
Changes in v5:
 - rename to PHYSDEVOP_msi_control
 - combine "mode" and "enable" into "flags"
 - refuse to enable both MSI and MSI-X, and also to enable MSI(-X) on
   incapable device
 - disable/enable INTx when enabling/disabling MSI (?)
 - refuse if !use_msi
 - adjust flask hook to make more sense (require "setup" access on
   device, not on domain)
 - rebase on master

I'm not sure if XSM part is correct, compile-tested only, as I'm not
sure how to set the policy.
---
 xen/arch/x86/msi.c                  | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 xen/arch/x86/physdev.c              | 25 ++++++++++++++++++-
 xen/arch/x86/x86_64/physdev.c       |  4 +++-
 xen/include/asm-x86/msi.h           |  1 +-
 xen/include/public/physdev.h        | 16 +++++++++++-
 xen/include/xlat.lst                |  1 +-
 xen/include/xsm/dummy.h             |  7 +++++-
 xen/include/xsm/xsm.h               |  6 ++++-
 xen/xsm/dummy.c                     |  1 +-
 xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c               | 24 +++++++++++++++++-
 xen/xsm/flask/policy/access_vectors |  1 +-
 11 files changed, 128 insertions(+)

diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/msi.c b/xen/arch/x86/msi.c
index 89e6116..fca1d04 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/msi.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/msi.c
@@ -1475,6 +1475,48 @@ int pci_restore_msi_state(struct pci_dev *pdev)
     return 0;
 }
 
+int msi_control(struct pci_dev *pdev, bool msix, bool enable)
+{
+    int ret;
+    struct msi_desc *old_desc;
+
+    if ( !use_msi )
+        return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+    ret = xsm_msi_control(XSM_DM_PRIV, pdev->domain, pdev->sbdf.sbdf, msix, 
enable);
+    if ( ret )
+        return ret;
+
+    if ( msix )
+    {
+        if ( !pdev->msix )
+            return -ENODEV;
+        old_desc = find_msi_entry(pdev, -1, PCI_CAP_ID_MSI);
+        if ( old_desc )
+            return -EBUSY;
+        if ( enable )
+            pci_intx(pdev, false);
+        msix_set_enable(pdev, enable);
+    }
+    else
+    {
+        if ( !pci_find_cap_offset(pdev->seg,
+                                  pdev->bus,
+                                  PCI_SLOT(pdev->devfn),
+                                  PCI_FUNC(pdev->devfn),
+                                  PCI_CAP_ID_MSI) )
+            return -ENODEV;
+        old_desc = find_msi_entry(pdev, -1, PCI_CAP_ID_MSIX);
+        if ( old_desc )
+            return -EBUSY;
+        if ( enable )
+            pci_intx(pdev, false);
+        msi_set_enable(pdev, enable);
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
 void __init early_msi_init(void)
 {
     if ( use_msi < 0 )
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/physdev.c b/xen/arch/x86/physdev.c
index 3a3c158..5000998 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/physdev.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/physdev.c
@@ -662,6 +662,31 @@ ret_t do_physdev_op(int cmd, XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(void) 
arg)
         break;
     }
 
+    case PHYSDEVOP_msi_control: {
+        struct physdev_msi_control op;
+        struct pci_dev *pdev;
+
+        ret = -EFAULT;
+        if ( copy_from_guest(&op, arg, 1) )
+            break;
+
+        ret = -EINVAL;
+        if ( op.flags & ~(PHYSDEVOP_MSI_CONTROL_MSIX | 
PHYSDEVOP_MSI_CONTROL_ENABLE) )
+            break;
+
+        pcidevs_lock();
+        pdev = pci_get_pdev(op.seg, op.bus, op.devfn);
+        if ( pdev )
+            ret = msi_control(pdev,
+                              op.flags & PHYSDEVOP_MSI_CONTROL_MSIX,
+                              op.flags & PHYSDEVOP_MSI_CONTROL_ENABLE);
+        else
+            ret = -ENODEV;
+        pcidevs_unlock();
+        break;
+
+    }
+
     default:
         ret = -ENOSYS;
         break;
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/physdev.c b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/physdev.c
index c5a00ea..69b4ce3 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/physdev.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/physdev.c
@@ -76,6 +76,10 @@ CHECK_physdev_pci_device_add
 CHECK_physdev_pci_device
 #undef xen_physdev_pci_device
 
+#define xen_physdev_msi_control physdev_msi_control
+CHECK_physdev_msi_control
+#undef xen_physdev_msi_control
+
 #define COMPAT
 #undef guest_handle_okay
 #define guest_handle_okay          compat_handle_okay
diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/msi.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/msi.h
index 10387dc..05296de 100644
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/msi.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/msi.h
@@ -252,5 +252,6 @@ void guest_mask_msi_irq(struct irq_desc *, bool mask);
 void ack_nonmaskable_msi_irq(struct irq_desc *);
 void end_nonmaskable_msi_irq(struct irq_desc *, u8 vector);
 void set_msi_affinity(struct irq_desc *, const cpumask_t *);
+int msi_control(struct pci_dev *pdev, bool msix, bool enable);
 
 #endif /* __ASM_MSI_H */
diff --git a/xen/include/public/physdev.h b/xen/include/public/physdev.h
index b6faf83..f9b728f 100644
--- a/xen/include/public/physdev.h
+++ b/xen/include/public/physdev.h
@@ -344,6 +344,22 @@ struct physdev_dbgp_op {
 typedef struct physdev_dbgp_op physdev_dbgp_op_t;
 DEFINE_XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(physdev_dbgp_op_t);
 
+/* when PHYSDEVOP_MSI_CONTROL_MSIX not set, control MSI */
+#define PHYSDEVOP_MSI_CONTROL_MSIX    1
+/* when PHYSDEVOP_MSI_CONTROL_ENABLE not set, disable */
+#define PHYSDEVOP_MSI_CONTROL_ENABLE  2
+
+#define PHYSDEVOP_msi_control   32
+struct physdev_msi_control {
+    /* IN */
+    uint16_t seg;
+    uint8_t bus;
+    uint8_t devfn;
+    uint8_t flags;
+};
+typedef struct physdev_msi_control physdev_msi_control_t;
+DEFINE_XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(physdev_msi_control_t);
+
 /*
  * Notify that some PIRQ-bound event channels have been unmasked.
  * ** This command is obsolete since interface version 0x00030202 and is **
diff --git a/xen/include/xlat.lst b/xen/include/xlat.lst
index 95f5e55..3082761 100644
--- a/xen/include/xlat.lst
+++ b/xen/include/xlat.lst
@@ -108,6 +108,7 @@
 ?      physdev_irq_status_query        physdev.h
 ?      physdev_manage_pci              physdev.h
 ?      physdev_manage_pci_ext          physdev.h
+?      physdev_msi_control             physdev.h
 ?      physdev_pci_device              physdev.h
 ?      physdev_pci_device_add          physdev.h
 ?      physdev_pci_mmcfg_reserved      physdev.h
diff --git a/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h b/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
index 01d2814..4801838 100644
--- a/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
+++ b/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
@@ -514,6 +514,13 @@ static XSM_INLINE int 
xsm_pci_config_permission(XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d
     return xsm_default_action(action, current->domain, d);
 }
 
+static XSM_INLINE int xsm_msi_control(XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d, 
uint32_t machine_bdf,
+                                      uint8_t msix, uint8_t enable)
+{
+    XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_DM_PRIV);
+    return xsm_default_action(action, current->domain, d);
+}
+
 static XSM_INLINE int xsm_add_to_physmap(XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d1, 
struct domain *d2)
 {
     XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_TARGET);
diff --git a/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h b/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h
index b6141f6..bf39dbd 100644
--- a/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h
+++ b/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h
@@ -106,6 +106,7 @@ struct xsm_operations {
     int (*iomem_permission) (struct domain *d, uint64_t s, uint64_t e, uint8_t 
allow);
     int (*iomem_mapping) (struct domain *d, uint64_t s, uint64_t e, uint8_t 
allow);
     int (*pci_config_permission) (struct domain *d, uint32_t machine_bdf, 
uint16_t start, uint16_t end, uint8_t access);
+    int (*msi_control) (struct domain *d, uint32_t machine_bdf, uint8_t msix, 
uint8_t enable);
 
 #if defined(CONFIG_HAS_PASSTHROUGH) && defined(CONFIG_HAS_PCI)
     int (*get_device_group) (uint32_t machine_bdf);
@@ -464,6 +465,11 @@ static inline int xsm_pci_config_permission (xsm_default_t 
def, struct domain *d
     return xsm_ops->pci_config_permission(d, machine_bdf, start, end, access);
 }
 
+static inline int xsm_msi_control (xsm_default_t def, struct domain *d, 
uint32_t machine_bdf, uint8_t msix, uint8_t enable)
+{
+    return xsm_ops->msi_control(d, machine_bdf, msix, enable);
+}
+
 #if defined(CONFIG_HAS_PASSTHROUGH) && defined(CONFIG_HAS_PCI)
 static inline int xsm_get_device_group(xsm_default_t def, uint32_t machine_bdf)
 {
diff --git a/xen/xsm/dummy.c b/xen/xsm/dummy.c
index c9a566f..878eefe 100644
--- a/xen/xsm/dummy.c
+++ b/xen/xsm/dummy.c
@@ -81,6 +81,7 @@ void __init xsm_fixup_ops (struct xsm_operations *ops)
     set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, iomem_permission);
     set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, iomem_mapping);
     set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, pci_config_permission);
+    set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, msi_control);
     set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, get_vnumainfo);
 
 #if defined(CONFIG_HAS_PASSTHROUGH) && defined(CONFIG_HAS_PCI)
diff --git a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
index a7d690a..5fb755e 100644
--- a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
+++ b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
@@ -1083,6 +1083,29 @@ static int flask_pci_config_permission(struct domain *d, 
uint32_t machine_bdf, u
 
 }
 
+static int flask_msi_control(struct domain *d, uint32_t machine_bdf, uint8_t 
msix, uint8_t enable)
+{
+    uint32_t dsid, rsid;
+    int rc = -EPERM;
+    struct avc_audit_data ad;
+    uint32_t perm;
+
+    AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DEV);
+    ad.device = machine_bdf;
+
+    rc = security_device_sid(machine_bdf, &rsid);
+    if ( rc )
+        return rc;
+
+    rc = avc_current_has_perm(rsid, SECCLASS_RESOURCE, RESOURCE__SETUP, &ad);
+    if ( rc )
+        return rc;
+
+    perm = flask_iommu_resource_use_perm();
+    dsid = domain_sid(d);
+    return avc_has_perm(dsid, rsid, SECCLASS_RESOURCE, perm, &ad);
+}
+
 static int flask_resource_plug_core(void)
 {
     return avc_current_has_perm(SECINITSID_DOMXEN, SECCLASS_RESOURCE, 
RESOURCE__PLUG, NULL);
@@ -1800,6 +1823,7 @@ static struct xsm_operations flask_ops = {
     .iomem_permission = flask_iomem_permission,
     .iomem_mapping = flask_iomem_mapping,
     .pci_config_permission = flask_pci_config_permission,
+    .msi_control = flask_msi_control,
 
     .resource_plug_core = flask_resource_plug_core,
     .resource_unplug_core = flask_resource_unplug_core,
diff --git a/xen/xsm/flask/policy/access_vectors 
b/xen/xsm/flask/policy/access_vectors
index 194d743..0ddfc91 100644
--- a/xen/xsm/flask/policy/access_vectors
+++ b/xen/xsm/flask/policy/access_vectors
@@ -466,6 +466,7 @@ class resource
 # checked for PHYSDEVOP_restore_msi* (target PCI device)
 # checked for PHYSDEVOP_setup_gsi (target IRQ)
 # checked for PHYSDEVOP_pci_mmcfg_reserved (target xen_t)
+# checked for PHYSDEVOP_msi_control (target PCI device)
     setup
 }
 
-- 
git-series 0.9.1

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