[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] xen/x86: vpmu: Unmap per-vCPU PMU page when the domain is destroyed
> -----Original Message----- > From: Julien Grall <jgrall@xxxxxxxxxx> > Sent: 27 November 2019 11:15 > To: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>; Durrant, Paul <pdurrant@xxxxxxxxxx> > Cc: xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx; Andrew Cooper > <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>; Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx>; Wei > Liu <wl@xxxxxxx> > Subject: Re: [PATCH] xen/x86: vpmu: Unmap per-vCPU PMU page when the > domain is destroyed > > Hi, > > On 27/11/2019 09:44, Jan Beulich wrote: > > On 26.11.2019 18:17, Paul Durrant wrote: > >> From: Julien Grall <jgrall@xxxxxxxxxx> > >> > >> A guest will setup a shared page with the hypervisor for each vCPU via > >> XENPMU_init. The page will then get mapped in the hypervisor and only > >> released when XEMPMU_finish is called. > >> > >> This means that if the guest is not shutdown gracefully (such as via xl > >> destroy), the page will stay mapped in the hypervisor. > > > > Isn't this still too weak a description? It's not the tool stack > > invoking XENPMU_finish, but the guest itself afaics. I.e. a > > misbehaving guest could prevent proper cleanup even with graceful > > shutdown. > > > >> @@ -2224,6 +2221,9 @@ int domain_relinquish_resources(struct domain *d) > >> if ( is_hvm_domain(d) ) > >> hvm_domain_relinquish_resources(d); > >> > >> + for_each_vcpu ( d, v ) > >> + vpmu_destroy(v); > >> + > >> return 0; > >> } > > > > I think simple things which may allow shrinking the page lists > > should be done early in the function. As vpmu_destroy() looks > > to be idempotent, how about leveraging the very first > > for_each_vcpu() loop in the function (there are too many of them > > there anyway, at least for my taste)? > > This is not entirely obvious that vpmu_destroy() is idempotent. > > For instance, I can't find out who is clearing VCPU_CONTEXT_ALLOCATED. > so I think vcpu_arch_destroy() would be executed over and over. > > I don't know whether this is an issue, but I can't figure out that is it > not one. Did I miss anything? It's sufficiently unobvious that it is a concern whether a guest invoking XENPMU_finish multiple times can cause harm. I'll see if I can clean that up. Paul > > Cheers, _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
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