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Re: [Xen-devel] vmi: supporting single-stepping on AMD processors


  • To: felix nasch <felix.nasch@xxxxxxxxx>, <xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Wed, 4 Dec 2019 15:57:23 +0000
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On 04/12/2019 15:32, felix nasch wrote:
> Hi,
>
> I am working on making libvmi[1] work on AMD, and one big issue is the lack
> of support for single-stepping on AMD processors in the vmi api offered by 
> xen.
> I think i have a way to get it to work, and I would like to know if you see
> any issues with this approach, and if there is any reason it hasnt been
> implemented like this.
>
> Looking at the code the reason why single-stepping works for intel,
> but not for amd seems to be that Intel-vtx has the handy
> 'Monitor Trap Flag' (MTF), while AMD does not offer such a feature in SVM.
> On Intel, if the MTF is set, after one guest instruction there is a
> vmexit with reason
> EXIT_REASON_MONITOR_TRAP_FLAG, which is then directly passed up as a
> HVM_MONITOR_SINGLESTEP_BREAKPOINT event.
>
> Studying the AMD manual and reading between the lines a bit I see the
> following way to implement single stepping on AMD:
>
> AMD Manual 15.6#VMEXIT:
>> When VMRUN loads a guest value of 1 in
>> EFLAGS.TF, that value does not cause a trace trap between
>> the VMRUN and the first guest
>> instruction, but rather after completion of the first guest instruction.
> So:
>
> 1. check if guest has rflags.tf set
> 2. set rflags.tf in the guest context
> 3. continue
> 4. get a vmexit with exception #DB
> 5. if rflags.tf was initially set, re-inject the event into the guest
> (to not interfere with standard singlestepping inside the guest)
> 6. emit HVM_MONITOR_SINGLESTEP_BREAKPOINT
>
> Most of the code that would be needed is already there in svm.c,
> i am preparing a patch to implement it as I imagine it above, but it will take
> me some time to test it.
>
> So is there any reason it has not been implemented like that already,
> and would you generally accept it to be done like this?

Hello.

You're not actually the first to ask about this, and since the last time
I was asked, I do have a more cunning idea.

Sadly, you can't use TF in the general case.  Yes - the example you give
would work in common cases, but TF is visible to, and editable by, the
guest.

It also changes behaviour depending on whether the guest chose to use
MSR_DEBUGCTL.BTR (Branch TRace) which causes one single-step per basic
block of code, rather than per instruction.

As an alternative, I'm informed that the meaning of the interrupt_shadow
field in the VMCB is "execute one instruction unconditionally", before
usual interrupt recognition activities resume.

Therefore, if you're up for some experimentation I have a suspicion that
the following might work, and without using any guest visible/mutable state.

1. Set interrupt_shadow=1
2. After CLGI on the vmenter path, send a self IPI
3. VMRUN should complete, execute one instruction, then exit because of
the pending IPI

Given that this is AMD, if you allocate a specific vector for the
purpose, you can spot and use the selective-eoi APIC extension to cancel
the IPI before STGI, so we don't even waste time running a no-op
interrupt handler.

~Andrew

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