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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH V6 1/4] x86/mm: Add array_index_nospec to guest provided index values
On 07.01.2020 14:25, Alexandru Stefan ISAILA wrote:
> On 27.12.2019 10:01, Jan Beulich wrote:
>> On 23.12.2019 15:04, Alexandru Stefan ISAILA wrote:
>>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_access.c
>>> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_access.c
>>> @@ -366,11 +366,12 @@ long p2m_set_mem_access(struct domain *d, gfn_t gfn,
>>> uint32_t nr,
>>> #ifdef CONFIG_HVM
>>> if ( altp2m_idx )
>>> {
>>> - if ( altp2m_idx >= MAX_ALTP2M ||
>>> - d->arch.altp2m_eptp[altp2m_idx] == mfn_x(INVALID_MFN) )
>>> + if ( altp2m_idx >= min(ARRAY_SIZE(d->arch.altp2m_p2m), MAX_EPTP)
>>> ||
>>
>> Stray blank after >= .
>>
>>> + d->arch.altp2m_eptp[array_index_nospec(altp2m_idx, MAX_EPTP)]
>>> ==
>>
>> I accept you can't (currently) use array_access_nospec() here,
>> but ...
>>
>>> + mfn_x(INVALID_MFN) )
>>> return -EINVAL;
>>>
>>> - ap2m = d->arch.altp2m_p2m[altp2m_idx];
>>> + ap2m = d->arch.altp2m_p2m[array_index_nospec(altp2m_idx,
>>> MAX_ALTP2M)];
>>
>> ... I don't see why you still effectively open-code it here.
>
> I am not sure I follow you here, that is what we agreed in v5
> (https://lists.xenproject.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2019-12/msg01704.html).
> Did I miss something?
In context there (from an earlier reply of mine) you will find me
having mentioned array_access_nospec(). This wasn't invalidated or
overridden by my "Yes, that's how I think it ought to be." I didn't
say so explicitly (again) because to me it goes without saying that
open-coding _anything_ is, in the common case, bad practice.
Jan
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