Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2] xsm: hide detailed Xen version from unprivileged guests

[George Dunlap <George.Dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx>]

> On Jan 11, 2020, at 4:02 AM, Doug Goldstein <cardoe@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 1/10/20 4:37 AM, Sergey Dyasli wrote:
>> Hide the following information that can help identify the running Xen
>> binary version: XENVER_extraversion, XENVER_compile_info, XENVER_changeset.
>> Add explicit cases for XENVER_commandline and XENVER_build_id as well.
>> Introduce xsm_filter_denied() to hvmloader to remove "<denied>" string
>> from guest's DMI tables that otherwise would be shown in tools like
>> dmidecode.
>> Signed-off-by: Sergey Dyasli <sergey.dyasli@xxxxxxxxxx>
>> ---
>> v1 --> v2:
>> - Added xsm_filter_denied() to hvmloader instead of modifying xen_deny()
> 
> So 100% this version of the patch won't fly with the various downstreams that 
> run the v1 of this patch. Those various consumers will stick with v1.
> 
> If the goal of this is to reduce the burden of the downstreams and their 
> customers to carry a patch against Xen then I wouldn't even bother with this 
> version.

If the goal is to come up with a solution that works for everyone, it would be 
helpful if you said *why* “various consumers” would find this patch 
unacceptable; and also what they might think about the alternate solutions 
proposed (and why).

 -George
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