[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-devel] [PATCH v7 4/7] x86/mem_sharing: use default_access in add_to_physmap
When plugging a hole in the target physmap don't use the access permission returned by __get_gfn_type_access as it is non-sensical (p2m_access_n) in the use-case add_to_physmap was intended to be used in. It leads to vm_events being sent out for access violations at unexpected locations. Make use of p2m->default_access instead and document the ambiguity surrounding "hole" types and corner-cases with custom mem_access being set on holes. Signed-off-by: Tamas K Lengyel <tamas.lengyel@xxxxxxxxx> --- v7: add detailed comment explaining the issue and why this fix is correct --- xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_sharing.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_sharing.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_sharing.c index 2b3be5b125..3835bc928f 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_sharing.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_sharing.c @@ -1061,6 +1061,29 @@ err_out: return ret; } +/* + * This function is intended to be used for plugging a "hole" in the client's + * physmap with a shared memory entry. Unfortunately the definition of a "hole" + * is currently ambigious. There are two cases one can run into a "hole": + * 1) there is no pagetable entry at all + * 2) there is a pagetable entry with a type that passes p2m_is_hole + * + * The intended use-case for this function is case 1. + * + * During 1) the mem_access being returned is p2m_access_n and that is + * incorrect to be applied to the new entry being added the client physmap, + * thus we make use of the p2m->default_access instead. + * When 2) is true it is possible that the existing pagetable entry also has + * a mem_access permission set, which could be p2m_access_n. Since we can't + * differentiate whether we are in case 1) or 2), we default to using the + * access permission defined as default for the p2m, thus in + * case 2) overwriting any custom mem_access permission the user may have set + * on a hole page. Custom mem_access permissions being set on a hole are + * unheard of but technically possible. + * + * TODO: to properly resolve this issue implement differentiation between the + * two "hole" types. + */ static int add_to_physmap(struct domain *sd, unsigned long sgfn, shr_handle_t sh, struct domain *cd, unsigned long cgfn, bool lock) @@ -1071,11 +1094,10 @@ int add_to_physmap(struct domain *sd, unsigned long sgfn, shr_handle_t sh, p2m_type_t smfn_type, cmfn_type; struct gfn_info *gfn_info; struct p2m_domain *p2m = p2m_get_hostp2m(cd); - p2m_access_t a; struct two_gfns tg; get_two_gfns(sd, _gfn(sgfn), &smfn_type, NULL, &smfn, - cd, _gfn(cgfn), &cmfn_type, &a, &cmfn, 0, &tg, lock); + cd, _gfn(cgfn), &cmfn_type, NULL, &cmfn, 0, &tg, lock); /* Get the source shared page, check and lock */ ret = XENMEM_SHARING_OP_S_HANDLE_INVALID; @@ -1110,7 +1132,7 @@ int add_to_physmap(struct domain *sd, unsigned long sgfn, shr_handle_t sh, } ret = p2m_set_entry(p2m, _gfn(cgfn), smfn, PAGE_ORDER_4K, - p2m_ram_shared, a); + p2m_ram_shared, p2m->default_access); /* Tempted to turn this into an assert */ if ( ret ) -- 2.20.1 _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
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