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Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 5/6] x86/smp: use a dedicated scratch cpumask in send_IPI_mask


  • To: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx>
  • From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Tue, 18 Feb 2020 15:34:08 +0000
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  • Cc: xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Wei Liu <wl@xxxxxxx>, Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>, Sander Eikelenboom <linux@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • Delivery-date: Tue, 18 Feb 2020 15:34:16 +0000
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  • List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xenproject.org>
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On 18/02/2020 14:43, Roger Pau Monné wrote:
> On Tue, Feb 18, 2020 at 01:29:56PM +0000, Andrew Cooper wrote:
>> On 18/02/2020 11:46, Roger Pau Monné wrote:
>>> On Tue, Feb 18, 2020 at 11:35:37AM +0000, Andrew Cooper wrote:
>>>> On 18/02/2020 11:22, Roger Pau Monné wrote:
>>>>> On Tue, Feb 18, 2020 at 11:21:12AM +0000, Andrew Cooper wrote:
>>>>>> On 18/02/2020 11:10, Roger Pau Monné wrote:
>>>>>>> On Tue, Feb 18, 2020 at 10:53:45AM +0000, Andrew Cooper wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 17/02/2020 18:43, Roger Pau Monne wrote:
>>>>>>>>> @@ -67,7 +68,20 @@ static void send_IPI_shortcut(unsigned int 
>>>>>>>>> shortcut, int vector,
>>>>>>>>>  void send_IPI_mask(const cpumask_t *mask, int vector)
>>>>>>>>>  {
>>>>>>>>>      bool cpus_locked = false;
>>>>>>>>> -    cpumask_t *scratch = this_cpu(scratch_cpumask);
>>>>>>>>> +    cpumask_t *scratch = this_cpu(send_ipi_cpumask);
>>>>>>>>> +    unsigned long flags;
>>>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>>>> +    if ( in_mc() || in_nmi() )
>>>>>>>>> +    {
>>>>>>>>> +        /*
>>>>>>>>> +         * When in #MC or #MNI context Xen cannot use the per-CPU 
>>>>>>>>> scratch mask
>>>>>>>>> +         * because we have no way to avoid reentry, so do not use 
>>>>>>>>> the APIC
>>>>>>>>> +         * shorthand.
>>>>>>>>> +         */
>>>>>>>>> +        alternative_vcall(genapic.send_IPI_mask, mask, vector);
>>>>>>>>> +        return;
>>>>>>>> The set of things you can safely do in an NMI/MCE handler is small, and
>>>>>>>> does not include sending IPIs.  (In reality, if you're using x2apic, it
>>>>>>>> is safe to send an IPI because there is no risk of clobbering ICR2
>>>>>>>> behind your outer context's back).
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> However, if we escalate from NMI/MCE context into crash context, then
>>>>>>>> anything goes.  In reality, we only ever send NMIs from the crash path,
>>>>>>>> and that is not permitted to use a shorthand, making this code dead.
>>>>>>> This was requested by Jan, as safety measure
>>>>>> That may be, but it doesn't mean it is correct.  If execution ever
>>>>>> enters this function in NMI/MCE context, there is a real,
>>>>>> state-corrupting bug, higher up the call stack.
>>>>> Ack, then I guess we should just BUG() here if ever called from #NMI
>>>>> or #MC context?
>>>> Well.  There is a reason I suggested removing it, and not using BUG().
>>>>
>>>> If NMI/MCE context escalates to crash context, we do need to send NMIs. 
>>>> It won't be this function specifically, but it will be part of the
>>>> general IPI infrastructure.
>>>>
>>>> We definitely don't want to get into the game of trying to clobber each
>>>> of the state variables, so the only thing throwing BUG()'s around in
>>>> this area will do is make the crash path more fragile.
>>> I see, panicking in such context will just clobber the previous crash
>>> happened in NMI/MC context.
>>>
>>> So you would rather keep the current version of falling back to the
>>> usage of the non-shorthand IPI sending routine instead of panicking?
>>>
>>> What about:
>>>
>>> if ( in_mc() || in_nmi() )
>>> {
>>>     /*
>>>      * When in #MC or #MNI context Xen cannot use the per-CPU scratch mask
>>>      * because we have no way to avoid reentry, so do not use the APIC
>>>      * shorthand. The only IPI that should be sent from such context
>>>      * is a #NMI to shutdown the system in case of a crash.
>>>      */
>>>     if ( vector == APIC_DM_NMI )
>>>             alternative_vcall(genapic.send_IPI_mask, mask, vector);
>>>     else
>>>         BUG();
>>>
>>>     return;
>>> }
>> How do you intent to test it?
>>
>> It might be correct now[*] but it doesn't protect against someone
>> modifying code, violating the constraint, and this going unnoticed
>> because the above codepath will only be entered in exceptional
>> circumstances.  Sods law says that code inside that block is first going
>> to be tested in a customer environment.
>>
>> ASSERT()s would be less bad, but any technical countermeasures, however
>> well intentioned, get in the way of the crash path functioning when it
>> matters most.
> OK, so what about:
>
> if ( in_mc() || in_nmi() )
> {
>     bool x2apic = current_local_apic_mode() == APIC_MODE_X2APIC;
>     unsigned int icr2;
>
>     /*
>      * When in #MC or #MNI context Xen cannot use the per-CPU scratch mask
>      * because we have no way to avoid reentry, so do not use the APIC
>      * shorthand. The only IPI that should be sent from such context
>      * is a #NMI to shutdown the system in case of a crash.
>      */
>     ASSERT(vector == APIC_DM_NMI);
>     if ( !x2apic )
>         icr2 = apic_read(APIC_ICR2);
>     alternative_vcall(genapic.send_IPI_mask, mask, vector);
>     if ( !x2apic )
>         apic_write(APIC_ICR2, icr2);
>
>     return;
> }
>
> I'm unsure as to whether the assert is actually helpful, but would
> like to settle this before sending a new version.

I can only repeat my previous email (questions and statements).

*Any* logic inside "if ( in_mc() || in_nmi() )" can't be tested
usefully, making it problematic as a sanity check.

(For this version of the code specifically, you absolutely don't want to
be reading MSR_APIC_BASE every time, and when we're on the crash path
sending NMIs, we don't care at all about clobbering ICR2.)

Doing nothing, is less bad than doing this.  There is no point trying to
cope with a corner case we don't support, and there is nothing you can
do, sanity wise, which doesn't come with a high chance of blowing up
first in a customer environment.

Literally, do nothing.  It is the least bad option going.

~Andrew

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