[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v3] x86: irq: Do not BUG_ON multiple unbind calls for shared pirqs
> -----Original Message----- > From: Xen-devel <xen-devel-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> On Behalf Of Jan > Beulich > Sent: 05 March 2020 09:37 > To: Gautam, Varad <vrd@xxxxxxxxx> > Cc: xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx; Andrew Cooper > <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>; Julien Grall > <julien@xxxxxxx>; Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx> > Subject: Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v3] x86: irq: Do not BUG_ON multiple unbind > calls for shared pirqs > > On 29.01.2020 12:47, Jan Beulich wrote: > > On 29.01.2020 11:30, Roger Pau Monné wrote: > >> Hello, > >> > >> Thanks for the patch! Next time could you please try to reply to the > >> previous questions before sending a new version: > >> > >> https://lists.xenproject.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2019-07/msg00257.html > >> > >> On Wed, Jan 29, 2020 at 10:28:07AM +0100, Varad Gautam wrote: > >>> XEN_DOMCTL_destroydomain creates a continuation if domain_kill -ERESTARTS. > >>> In that scenario, it is possible to receive multiple _pirq_guest_unbind > >>> calls for the same pirq from domain_kill, if the pirq has not yet been > >>> removed from the domain's pirq_tree, as: > >>> domain_kill() > >>> -> domain_relinquish_resources() > >>> -> pci_release_devices() > >>> -> pci_clean_dpci_irq() > >>> -> pirq_guest_unbind() > >>> -> __pirq_guest_unbind() > >>> > >>> For a shared pirq (nr_guests > 1), the first call would zap the current > >>> domain from the pirq's guests[] list, but the action handler is never > >>> freed > >>> as there are other guests using this pirq. As a result, on the second > >>> call, > >>> __pirq_guest_unbind searches for the current domain which has been removed > >>> from the guests[] list, and hits a BUG_ON. > >>> > >>> Make __pirq_guest_unbind safe to be called multiple times by letting xen > >>> continue if a shared pirq has already been unbound from this guest. The > >>> PIRQ will be cleaned up from the domain's pirq_tree during the destruction > >>> in complete_domain_destroy anyways. > >> > >> So AFAICT this is because pt_pirq_softirq_active() returns true in > >> pci_clean_dpci_irq() and hence the iteration is stopped and > >> hvm_domain_irq(d)->dpci is not set to NULL. > >> > >> Would it be possible to clean the already processed IRQs from the > >> domain pirq_tree? > > > > This might work, perhaps by way of invoking unmap_domain_pirq() > > right after pirq_guest_unbind(), as long as hvm_dirq_assist() (as > > called from dpci_softirq()) can be made skip all actual work it > > means to do in such a case. Unfortunately the two ->masked fields > > acted upon are different between __pirq_guest_unbind() and > > hvm_dirq_assist(). > > Ping? Unless I hear back soon, I'm afraid I'm going to drop this > patch from my "pending" mail folder, as not being agreed whether > to stick to the current version or whether to go this alternative > route. A more "natural" approach to fixing the issue would be > quite nice, after all. I'll try to pick this up tomorrow as I helped diagnose the problem being fixed. Paul > > Jan > > _______________________________________________ > Xen-devel mailing list > Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx > https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
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