[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v4] x86: irq: Do not BUG_ON multiple unbind calls for shared pirqs
On 06.03.2020 17:02, paul@xxxxxxx wrote: > From: Varad Gautam <vrd@xxxxxxxxx> > > XEN_DOMCTL_destroydomain creates a continuation if domain_kill -ERESTARTS. > In that scenario, it is possible to receive multiple __pirq_guest_unbind > calls for the same pirq from domain_kill, if the pirq has not yet been > removed from the domain's pirq_tree, as: > domain_kill() > -> domain_relinquish_resources() > -> pci_release_devices() > -> pci_clean_dpci_irq() > -> pirq_guest_unbind() > -> __pirq_guest_unbind() > > For a shared pirq (nr_guests > 1), the first call would zap the current > domain from the pirq's guests[] list, but the action handler is never freed > as there are other guests using this pirq. As a result, on the second call, > __pirq_guest_unbind searches for the current domain which has been removed > from the guests[] list, and hits a BUG_ON. > > Make __pirq_guest_unbind safe to be called multiple times by letting xen > continue if a shared pirq has already been unbound from this guest. The > PIRQ will be cleaned up from the domain's pirq_tree during the destruction > in complete_domain_destroy anyway. > > Signed-off-by: Varad Gautam <vrd@xxxxxxxxx> > [taking over from Varad at v4] > Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xxxxxxx> > --- > Cc: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> > Cc: Julien Grall <julien@xxxxxxx> > Cc: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx> > Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> > > Roger suggested cleaning the entry from the domain pirq_tree so that > we need not make it safe to re-call __pirq_guest_unbind(). This seems like > a reasonable suggestion but the semantics of the code are almost > impenetrable (e.g. 'pirq' is used to mean an index, a pointer and is also > the name of struct so you generally have little idea what it actally means) > so I prefer to stick with a small fix that I can actually reason about. > > v4: > - Re-work the guest array search to make it clearer I.e. there are cosmetic differences to v3 (see below), but technically it's still the same. I can't believe the re-use of "pirq" for different entities is this big of a problem. But anyway: > --- a/xen/arch/x86/irq.c > +++ b/xen/arch/x86/irq.c > @@ -1680,9 +1680,23 @@ static irq_guest_action_t *__pirq_guest_unbind( > > BUG_ON(!(desc->status & IRQ_GUEST)); > > - for ( i = 0; (i < action->nr_guests) && (action->guest[i] != d); i++ ) > - continue; > - BUG_ON(i == action->nr_guests); > + for ( i = 0; i < action->nr_guests; i++ ) > + if ( action->guest[i] == d ) > + break; > + > + if ( i == action->nr_guests ) /* No matching entry */ > + { > + /* > + * In case the pirq was shared, unbound for this domain in an earlier > + * call, but still existed on the domain's pirq_tree, we still reach > + * here if there are any later unbind calls on the same pirq. Return > + * if such an unbind happens. > + */ > + ASSERT(action->shareable); > + return NULL; > + } > + > + ASSERT(action->nr_guests > 0); This seems pointless to have here - v3 had it inside the if(), where it would actually guard against coming here with nr_guests equal to zero. v3 also used if() and BUG() instead of ASSERT() inside this if(), which to me would seem more in line with our current ./CODING_STYLE guidelines of handling unexpected conditions. Could you clarify why you switched things? Jan _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
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