[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Xen Security Advisory 318 v3 (CVE-2020-11742) - Bad continuation handling in GNTTABOP_copy
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 Xen Security Advisory CVE-2020-11742 / XSA-318 version 3 Bad continuation handling in GNTTABOP_copy UPDATES IN VERSION 3 ==================== Public release. ISSUE DESCRIPTION ================= Grant table operations are expected to return 0 for success, and a negative number for errors. The fix for CVE-2017-12135 / XSA-226 introduced a path through grant copy handling where success may be returned to the caller without any action taken. In particular the status fields of individual operations are left uninitialised, and may result in errant behaviour in the caller of GNTTABOP_copy. IMPACT ====== A buggy or malicious guest can construct its grant table in such a way that, when a backend domain tries to copy a grant, it hits the incorrect exit path. This returns success to the caller without doing anything, which may cause in crashes or other incorrect behaviour. VULNERABLE SYSTEMS ================== Systems running any version of Xen are vulnerable. MITIGATION ========== Only guests with access to transitive grants can exploit the vulnerability. In particular, this means that: * ARM systems which have taken the XSA-268 fix are not vulnerable, as Grant Table v2 was disabled for other security reasons. * All systems with the XSA-226 fixes, and booted with `gnttab=max-ver:1` or `gnttab=no-transitive` are not vulnerable. CREDITS ======= This issue was discovered by Pawel Wieczorkiewicz of Amazon and Jürgen Groß of SUSE. RESOLUTION ========== Applying the attached patch resolves this issue. Note that patches for released versions are generally prepared to apply to the stable branches, and may not apply cleanly to the most recent release tarball. Downstreams are encouraged to update to the tip of the stable branch before applying these patches. xsa318.patch Xen 4.9 - xen-unstable $ sha256sum xsa318* 4618c2609ab08178977c2b2a3d13f380ccfddd0168caca5ced708dd76a8e547c xsa318.patch $ NOTE CONCERNING SHORT EMBARGO ============================= This issue was discovered in response to the XSA-316 predisclosure. DEPLOYMENT DURING EMBARGO ========================= Deployment of the patches described above (or others which are substantially similar) is permitted during the embargo, even on public-facing systems with untrusted guest users and administrators. But: Distribution of updated software is prohibited (except to other members of the predisclosure list). Predisclosure list members who wish to deploy significantly different patches and/or mitigations, please contact the Xen Project Security Team. However, deployment of the mitigations is NOT permitted (except where all the affected systems and VMs are administered and used only by organisations which are members of the Xen Project Security Issues Predisclosure List). Specifically, deployment on public cloud systems is NOT permitted. This is because it is a guest visible change which will draw attention to the issue. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQFABAEBCAAqFiEEI+MiLBRfRHX6gGCng/4UyVfoK9kFAl6Vpd4MHHBncEB4ZW4u b3JnAAoJEIP+FMlX6CvZbC8IAIkpehqymi1+zrWN1OHdvIYIMv2TCzSSx3UtsoMk J67FpgDzX8ZLfiE0x5FELs3KUdILOe5IkEmM2ssrvQRoIp+X3U4Ybm6eoIB+BzjD bmJReqNYVY6dlJuAhO2i6L125uBITWdntlK/ZOOQAOd77hR2KueuGELV7KUoPbQa SAiQ8jsCjqWCacYll6oq1c7jRlc1+RD/5JjkGveHlLmLOnIiS96PkDzqskM8Aniz TLZ4WmIpfixDAHn3OYyHGoUyhNW3qlps3evDyj3Wela62LFsymDSHkcV8XFBLTGT pueuSELzne5m85moAB2UqKVhHDV+PRCV7bLHYm/s7yeIHSg= =hix9 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Attachment:
xsa318.patch
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