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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [PATCH for-4.14] x86/livepatch: Make livepatching compatible with CET Shadow Stacks
On 15/06/2020 16:16, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>> @@ -58,6 +59,10 @@ int arch_livepatch_safety_check(void)
>>>>
>>>> int arch_livepatch_quiesce(void)
>>>> {
>>>> + /* If Shadow Stacks are in use, disable CR4.CET so we can modify
>>>> CR0.WP. */
>>>> + if ( cpu_has_xen_shstk )
>>>> + write_cr4(read_cr4() & ~X86_CR4_CET);
>>>> +
>>>> /* Disable WP to allow changes to read-only pages. */
>>>> write_cr0(read_cr0() & ~X86_CR0_WP);
>>>>
>>>> @@ -68,6 +73,29 @@ void arch_livepatch_revive(void)
>>>> {
>>>> /* Reinstate WP. */
>>>> write_cr0(read_cr0() | X86_CR0_WP);
>>>> +
>>>> + /* Clobber dirty bits and reinstate CET, if applicable. */
>>>> + if ( IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_XEN_SHSTK) && cpu_has_xen_shstk )
>>>> + {
>>>> + unsigned long tmp;
>>>> +
>>>> + reset_virtual_region_perms();
>>>> +
>>>> + write_cr4(read_cr4() | X86_CR4_CET);
>>>> +
>>>> + /*
>>>> + * Fix up the return address on the shadow stack, which currently
>>>> + * points at arch_livepatch_quiesce()'s caller.
>>>> + *
>>>> + * Note: this is somewhat fragile, and depends on both
>>>> + * arch_livepatch_{quiesce,revive}() being called from the same
>>>> + * function, which is currently the case.
>>>> + */
>>>> + asm volatile ("rdsspq %[ssp];"
>>>> + "wrssq %[addr], (%[ssp]);"
>>>> + : [ssp] "=&r" (tmp)
>>>> + : [addr] "r" (__builtin_return_address(0)));
>>>> + }
>>> To be safe against LTO I think this wants accompanying with making
>>> both functions noinline.
>> Hmm true.
>>
>>> As to the fragility - how about arch_livepatch_quiesce() returning
>>> __builtin_return_address(0) to its caller, for passing into here
>>> for verification? This would also make more noticeable that the
>>> two should be be called from the same function (or else the "token"
>>> would need passing further around).
>> This I'm less certain about, as its fairly invasive to common code, just
>> to bodge around something I don't expect to last very long into the 4.15
>> timeframe.
> I don't see it being invasive - there's a new local variable needed
> in both of apply_payload() and revert_payload(), and of course the
> call sites would need adjustment.
Exactly - the call site adjustment is what makes it invasive in common
code, and all other architectures.
Any getting this wrong will die with #CP[near ret] anyway.
The only thing passing that value around would do is let you tweak the
error message slightly before we crash out.
>>>> @@ -91,6 +92,18 @@ void unregister_virtual_region(struct virtual_region *r)
>>>> remove_virtual_region(r);
>>>> }
>>>>
>>>> +void reset_virtual_region_perms(void)
>>>> +{
>>>> + const struct virtual_region *region;
>>>> +
>>>> + rcu_read_lock(&rcu_virtual_region_lock);
>>>> + list_for_each_entry_rcu( region, &virtual_region_list, list )
>>>> + modify_xen_mappings((unsigned long)region->start,
>>>> + ROUNDUP((unsigned long)region->end,
>>>> PAGE_SIZE),
>>>> + PAGE_HYPERVISOR_RX);
>>>> + rcu_read_unlock(&rcu_virtual_region_lock);
>>>> +}
>>> Doesn't this result in shattering the trailing (and currently still
>>> only) 2Mb page mapping .text in the xen.efi case?
>> Not any more or less than its already clobbered by this logic in the
>> alternatives path, I think?
> Not afaict, there we have
>
> if ( cpu_has_xen_shstk )
> modify_xen_mappings(XEN_VIRT_START + MB(2),
> (unsigned long)&__2M_text_end,
> PAGE_HYPERVISOR_RX);
Hmm ok. I'll make a note.
>>> With the
>>> expectation of the approach changing in 4.15 this may not need
>>> addressing, but should imo be mentioned as a shortcoming in the
>>> description then.
>>>
>>> Also - how about "restore" instead of "reset"?
>> Why? We're not passing some state sideways into the new mappings -
>> we're resetting them to their expected values.
> To me as a non-native speaker "reset" means more like some initial
> state, whereas "restore" means more like "to some intended state".
I feel that is a very subjective interpretation, but even if we go with
it, the fact the function is void distinguishes the two.
~Andrew
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