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Re: [PATCH v7 03/15] x86/mm: rewrite virt_to_xen_l*e



On 29.05.2020 13:11, Hongyan Xia wrote:
> From: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@xxxxxxxxxx>
> 
> Rewrite those functions to use the new APIs. Modify its callers to unmap
> the pointer returned. Since alloc_xen_pagetable_new() is almost never
> useful unless accompanied by page clearing and a mapping, introduce a
> helper alloc_map_clear_xen_pt() for this sequence.
> 
> Note that the change of virt_to_xen_l1e() also requires vmap_to_mfn() to
> unmap the page, which requires domain_page.h header in vmap.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Signed-off-by: Hongyan Xia <hongyxia@xxxxxxxxxx>

Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
with two further small adjustments:

> --- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
> @@ -4948,8 +4948,28 @@ void free_xen_pagetable_new(mfn_t mfn)
>          free_xenheap_page(mfn_to_virt(mfn_x(mfn)));
>  }
>  
> +void *alloc_map_clear_xen_pt(mfn_t *pmfn)
> +{
> +    mfn_t mfn = alloc_xen_pagetable_new();
> +    void *ret;
> +
> +    if ( mfn_eq(mfn, INVALID_MFN) )
> +        return NULL;
> +
> +    if ( pmfn )
> +        *pmfn = mfn;
> +    ret = map_domain_page(mfn);
> +    clear_page(ret);
> +
> +    return ret;
> +}
> +
>  static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(map_pgdir_lock);
>  
> +/*
> + * For virt_to_xen_lXe() functions, they take a virtual address and return a
> + * pointer to Xen's LX entry. Caller needs to unmap the pointer.
> + */
>  static l3_pgentry_t *virt_to_xen_l3e(unsigned long v)

May I suggest s/virtual/linear/ to at least make the new comment
correct?

> --- a/xen/include/asm-x86/page.h
> +++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/page.h
> @@ -291,7 +291,13 @@ void copy_page_sse2(void *, const void *);
>  #define pfn_to_paddr(pfn)   __pfn_to_paddr(pfn)
>  #define paddr_to_pfn(pa)    __paddr_to_pfn(pa)
>  #define paddr_to_pdx(pa)    pfn_to_pdx(paddr_to_pfn(pa))
> -#define vmap_to_mfn(va)     _mfn(l1e_get_pfn(*virt_to_xen_l1e((unsigned 
> long)(va))))
> +
> +#define vmap_to_mfn(va) ({                                                  \
> +        const l1_pgentry_t *pl1e_ = virt_to_xen_l1e((unsigned long)(va));   \
> +        mfn_t mfn_ = l1e_get_mfn(*pl1e_);                                   \
> +        unmap_domain_page(pl1e_);                                           \
> +        mfn_; })

Just like is already the case in domain_page_map_to_mfn() I think
you want to add "BUG_ON(!pl1e)" here to limit the impact of any
problem to DoS (rather than a possible privilege escalation).

Or actually, considering the only case where virt_to_xen_l1e()
would return NULL, returning INVALID_MFN here would likely be
even more robust. There looks to be just a single caller, which
would need adjusting to cope with an error coming back. In fact -
it already ASSERT()s, despite NULL right now never coming back
from vmap_to_page(). I think the loop there would better be

    for ( i = 0; i < pages; i++ )
    {
        struct page_info *page = vmap_to_page(va + i * PAGE_SIZE);

        if ( page )
            page_list_add(page, &pg_list);
        else
            printk_once(...);
    }

Thoughts?

Jan



 


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