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Re: [PATCH v2] x86/pv: Inject #UD for missing SYSCALL callbacks

  • To: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
  • From: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Wed, 14 Oct 2020 16:16:20 +0200
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  • Cc: Xen-devel <xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Jan Beulich <JBeulich@xxxxxxxx>, Wei Liu <wl@xxxxxxx>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>, Manuel Bouyer <bouyer@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
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  • List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xenproject.org>

On Fri, Oct 09, 2020 at 12:53:01PM +0100, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> Despite appearing to be a deliberate design choice of early PV64, the
> resulting behaviour for unregistered SYSCALL callbacks creates an untenable
> testability problem for Xen.  Furthermore, the behaviour is undocumented,
> bizarre, and inconsistent with related behaviour in Xen, and very liable
> introduce a security vulnerability into a PV guest if the author hasn't
> studied Xen's assembly code in detail.
> There are two different bugs here.
> 1) The current logic confuses the registered entrypoints, and may deliver a
>    SYSCALL from 32bit userspace to the 64bit entry, when only a 64bit
>    entrypoint is registered.
>    This has been the case ever since 2007 (c/s cd75d47348b) but up until
>    2018 (c/s dba899de14) the wrong selectors would be handed to the guest for
>    a 32bit SYSCALL entry, making it appear as if it a 64bit entry all along.
>    Xen would malfunction under these circumstances, if it were a PV guest.
>    Linux would as well, but PVOps has always registered both entrypoints and
>    discarded the Xen-provided selectors.  NetBSD really does malfunction as a
>    consequence (benignly now, but a VM DoS before the 2018 Xen selector fix).
> 2) In the case that neither SYSCALL callbacks are registered, the guest will
>    be crashed when userspace executes a SYSCALL instruction, which is a
>    userspace => kernel DoS.
>    This has been the case ever since the introduction of 64bit PV support, but
>    behaves unlike all other SYSCALL/SYSENTER callbacks in Xen, which yield
>    #GP/#UD in userspace before the callback is registered, and are therefore
>    safe by default.

This seems fairly reasonable, as it turns a guest crash into an #UD

> This change does constitute a change in the PV ABI, for corner cases of a PV
> guest kernel registering neither callback, or not registering the 32bit
> callback when running on AMD/Hygon hardware.

Is there any place suitable to document this behavior?

> It brings the behaviour in line with PV32 SYSCALL/SYSENTER, and PV64
> SYSENTER (safe by default, until explicitly enabled), as well as native
> hardware (always delivered to the single applicable callback).
> Most importantly however, and the primary reason for the change, is that it
> lets us sensibly test the fast system call entrypoints under all states a PV
> guest can construct, to prove correct behaviour.
> Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
> CC: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@xxxxxxxx>
> CC: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx>
> CC: Wei Liu <wl@xxxxxxx>
> CC: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
> CC: Manuel Bouyer <bouyer@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> v2:
>  * Drop unnecessary instruction suffixes
>  * Don't truncate #UD entrypoint to 32 bits
> Manuel: This will result in a corner case change for NetBSD.
> At the moment on native, 32bit userspace on 64bit NetBSD will get #UD (Intel,
> etc), or an explicit -ENOSYS (AMD, etc) when trying to execute a 32bit SYSCALL
> instruction.
> After this change, a 64bit PV VM will consistently see #UD (like on Intel, etc
> hardware) even when running on AMD/Hygon hardware (as Xsyscall32 isn't
> registered with Xen), rather than following Xsyscall into the proper system
> call path.

Would this result in a regression for NetBSD then? Is it fine to see
#UD regardless of the platform? It's not clear to me from the text
above whether this change will cause issues with NetBSD.




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