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[PATCH] x86emul: de-duplicate scatters to the same linear address



The SDM specifically allows for earlier writes to fully overlapping
ranges to be dropped. If a guest did so, hvmemul_phys_mmio_access()
would crash it if varying data was written to the same address. Detect
overlaps early, as doing so in hvmemul_{linear,phys}_mmio_access() would
be quite a bit more difficult.

Note that due to cache slot use being linear address based, there's no
similar issue with multiple writes to the same physical address (mapped
through different linear addresses).

Since this requires an adjustment to the EVEX Disp8 scaling test,
correct a comment there at the same time.

Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
---
TBD: The SDM isn't entirely unambiguous about the faulting behavior in
     this case: If a fault would need delivering on the earlier slot
     despite the write getting squashed, we'd have to call ops->write()
     with size set to zero for the earlier write(s). However,
     hvm/emulate.c's handling of zero-byte accesses extends only to the
     virtual-to-linear address conversions (and raising of involved
     faults), so in order to also observe #PF changes to that logic
     would then also be needed. Can we live with a possible misbehavior
     here?

--- a/tools/tests/x86_emulator/evex-disp8.c
+++ b/tools/tests/x86_emulator/evex-disp8.c
@@ -647,8 +647,8 @@ static const uint16_t imm0f[16] = {
 static struct x86_emulate_ops emulops;
 
 /*
- * Access tracking (by granular) is used on the first 64 bytes of address
- * space. Instructions get encode with a raw Disp8 value of 1, which then
+ * Access tracking (byte granular) is used on the first bytes of address
+ * space. Instructions get encoded with a raw Disp8 value of 1, which then
  * gets scaled accordingly. Hence accesses below the address <scaling factor>
  * as well as at or above 2 * <scaling factor> are indications of bugs. To
  * aid diagnosis / debugging, track all accesses below 3 * <scaling factor>.
@@ -804,6 +804,31 @@ static void test_one(const struct test *
 
     asm volatile ( "kxnorw %k1, %k1, %k1" );
     asm volatile ( "vxorps %xmm4, %xmm4, %xmm4" );
+    if ( sg && (test->opc | 3) == 0xa3 )
+    {
+        /*
+         * Non-prefetch scatters need handling specially, due to the
+         * overlapped write elimination done by the emulator. The order of
+         * indexes chosen is somewhat arbitrary, within the constraints
+         * imposed by the various different uses.
+         */
+        static const struct {
+            int32_t _[16];
+        } off32 = {{ 1, 0, 2, 3, 7, 6, 5, 4, 8, 10, 12, 14, 9, 11, 13, 15 }};
+
+        if ( test->opc & 1 )
+        {
+            asm volatile ( "vpmovsxdq %0, %%zmm4" :: "m" (off32) );
+            vsz >>= !evex.w;
+        }
+        else
+            asm volatile ( "vmovdqu32 %0, %%zmm4" :: "m" (off32) );
+
+        /* Scale by element size. */
+        instr[6] |= (evex.w | 2) << 6;
+
+        sg = false;
+    }
 
     ctxt->regs->eip = (unsigned long)&instr[0];
     ctxt->regs->edx = 0;
--- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c
@@ -10032,25 +10032,47 @@ x86_emulate(
 
         for ( i = 0; op_mask; ++i )
         {
-            long idx = b & 1 ? index.qw[i] : index.dw[i];
+            long idx = (b & 1 ? index.qw[i]
+                              : index.dw[i]) * (1 << state->sib_scale);
+            unsigned long offs = truncate_ea(ea.mem.off + idx);
+            unsigned int j;
 
             if ( !(op_mask & (1 << i)) )
                 continue;
 
-            rc = ops->write(ea.mem.seg,
-                            truncate_ea(ea.mem.off +
-                                        idx * (1 << state->sib_scale)),
-                            (void *)mmvalp + i * op_bytes, op_bytes, ctxt);
-            if ( rc != X86EMUL_OKAY )
+            /*
+             * hvmemul_linear_mmio_access() will find a cache slot based on
+             * linear address. hvmemul_phys_mmio_access() will crash the
+             * domain if observing varying data getting written to the same
+             * address within a cache slot. Utilize that squashing earlier
+             * writes to fully overlapping addresses is permitted by the spec.
+             */
+            for ( j = i + 1; j < n; ++j )
             {
-                /* See comment in gather emulation. */
-                if ( rc != X86EMUL_EXCEPTION && done )
-                    rc = X86EMUL_RETRY;
-                break;
+                long idx2 = (b & 1 ? index.qw[j]
+                                   : index.dw[j]) * (1 << state->sib_scale);
+
+                if ( (op_mask & (1 << j)) &&
+                     truncate_ea(ea.mem.off + idx2) == offs )
+                    break;
+            }
+
+            if ( j >= n )
+            {
+                rc = ops->write(ea.mem.seg, offs,
+                                (void *)mmvalp + i * op_bytes, op_bytes, ctxt);
+                if ( rc != X86EMUL_OKAY )
+                {
+                    /* See comment in gather emulation. */
+                    if ( rc != X86EMUL_EXCEPTION && done )
+                        rc = X86EMUL_RETRY;
+                    break;
+                }
+
+                done = true;
             }
 
             op_mask &= ~(1 << i);
-            done = true;
 
 #ifdef __XEN__
             if ( op_mask && local_events_need_delivery() )



 


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