[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [PATCH v3 5/5] evtchn: don't call Xen consumer callback with per-channel lock held
On Fri, Dec 4, 2020 at 2:22 PM Julien Grall <julien.grall.oss@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > On Fri, 4 Dec 2020 at 19:15, Tamas K Lengyel <tamas.k.lengyel@xxxxxxxxx> > wrote: > > > > On Fri, Dec 4, 2020 at 10:29 AM Julien Grall <julien@xxxxxxx> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > On 04/12/2020 15:21, Tamas K Lengyel wrote: > > > > On Fri, Dec 4, 2020 at 6:29 AM Julien Grall <julien@xxxxxxx> wrote: > > > >> > > > >> Hi Jan, > > > >> > > > >> On 03/12/2020 10:09, Jan Beulich wrote: > > > >>> On 02.12.2020 22:10, Julien Grall wrote: > > > >>>> On 23/11/2020 13:30, Jan Beulich wrote: > > > >>>>> While there don't look to be any problems with this right now, the > > > >>>>> lock > > > >>>>> order implications from holding the lock can be very difficult to > > > >>>>> follow > > > >>>>> (and may be easy to violate unknowingly). The present callbacks > > > >>>>> don't > > > >>>>> (and no such callback should) have any need for the lock to be held. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> However, vm_event_disable() frees the structures used by respective > > > >>>>> callbacks and isn't otherwise synchronized with invocations of these > > > >>>>> callbacks, so maintain a count of in-progress calls, for > > > >>>>> evtchn_close() > > > >>>>> to wait to drop to zero before freeing the port (and dropping the > > > >>>>> lock). > > > >>>> > > > >>>> AFAICT, this callback is not the only place where the > > > >>>> synchronization is > > > >>>> missing in the VM event code. > > > >>>> > > > >>>> For instance, vm_event_put_request() can also race against > > > >>>> vm_event_disable(). > > > >>>> > > > >>>> So shouldn't we handle this issue properly in VM event? > > > >>> > > > >>> I suppose that's a question to the VM event folks rather than me? > > > >> > > > >> Yes. From my understanding of Tamas's e-mail, they are relying on the > > > >> monitoring software to do the right thing. > > > >> > > > >> I will refrain to comment on this approach. However, given the race is > > > >> much wider than the event channel, I would recommend to not add more > > > >> code in the event channel to deal with such problem. > > > >> > > > >> Instead, this should be fixed in the VM event code when someone has > > > >> time > > > >> to harden the subsystem. > > > > > > > > I double-checked and the disable route is actually more robust, we > > > > don't just rely on the toolstack doing the right thing. The domain > > > > gets paused before any calls to vm_event_disable. So I don't think > > > > there is really a race-condition here. > > > > > > The code will *only* pause the monitored domain. I can see two issues: > > > 1) The toolstack is still sending event while destroy is happening. > > > This is the race discussed here. > > > 2) The implement of vm_event_put_request() suggests that it can be > > > called with not-current domain. > > > > > > I don't see how just pausing the monitored domain is enough here. > > > > Requests only get generated by the monitored domain. > > If that's the case, then why is vm_event_put_request() able to > deal with a non-current domain? > > I understand that you are possibly trusting who may call it, but this > looks quite fragile. I didn't write the system. You probably want to ask that question from the original author. Tamas
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