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[PATCH 00/17] x86/PV: avoid speculation abuse through guest accessors plus ...

... shadow adjustments towards not building 2- and 3-level code
when !HVM. While the latter isn't functionally related to the
former, it depends on some of the rearrangements done there.

01: shadow: use __put_user() instead of __copy_to_user()
02: split __{get,put}_user() into "guest" and "unsafe" variants
03: split __copy_{from,to}_user() into "guest" and "unsafe" variants
04: PV: harden guest memory accesses against speculative abuse
05: rename {get,put}_user() to {get,put}_guest()
06: gdbsx: convert "user" to "guest" accesses
07: rename copy_{from,to}_user() to copy_{from,to}_guest_pv()
08: move stac()/clac() from {get,put}_unsafe_asm() ...
09: PV: use get_unsafe() instead of copy_from_unsafe()
10: shadow: use get_unsafe() instead of copy_from_unsafe()
11: shadow: polish shadow_write_entries()
12: shadow: move shadow_set_l<N>e() to their own source file
13: shadow: don't open-code SHF_* shorthands
14: shadow: SH_type_l2h_shadow is PV-only
15: shadow: drop SH_type_l2h_pae_shadow
16: shadow: only 4-level guest code needs building when !HVM
17: shadow: adjust is_pv_*() checks




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