Re: Xen Security Advisory 360 v1 - IRQ vector leak on x86

[Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx>]

On Thu, Jan 21, 2021 at 03:50:55PM +0100, Jan Beulich wrote:
> On 21.01.2021 15:34, Roger Pau Monné wrote:
> > On Thu, Jan 21, 2021 at 03:20:12PM +0100, Marek Marczykowski-Górecki wrote:
> >> On Thu, Jan 21, 2021 at 02:10:48PM +0000, Xen.org security team wrote:
> >>>                     Xen Security Advisory XSA-360
> >>>
> >>>                         IRQ vector leak on x86
> >>>
> >>> ISSUE DESCRIPTION
> >>> =================
> >>>
> >>> A x86 HVM guest with PCI pass through devices can force the allocation
> >>> of all IDT vectors on the system by rebooting itself with MSI or MSI-X
> >>> capabilities enabled and entries setup.
> >>
> >> (...)
> >>
> >>> MITIGATION
> >>> ==========
> >>>
> >>> Not running HVM guests with PCI pass through devices will avoid the
> >>> vulnerability.  Note that even non-malicious guests can trigger this
> >>> vulnerability as part of normal operation.
> >>
> >> Does the 'on_reboot="destroy"' mitigate the issue too? Or on_soft_reset?
> > 
> > Kind of. Note you will still leak the in use vectors when the guest is
> > destroyed, but that would prevent the guest from entering a reboot
> > loop and exhausting all vectors on the system unless the admin starts
> > it again.
> > 
> > In that case I think the premise of a guest 'rebooting itself' doesn't
> > apply anymore, since the guest won't be able to perform such
> > operation.
> 
> And how exactly would an admin tell a guest from rebooting for
> fair reasons from one rebooting for malicious reasons? To me,
> setting 'on_reboot="destroy"' would imply there's then some
> other mechanism to restart the guest (possibly with some delay),
> or else a reboot attempt by this guest would effectively be a
> DoS to its users.

Well, I would expect there are deployments or configurations that
simply don't expect (some) domains to reboot themselves. Ie: for
example you won't expect driver domains to restart themselves I think,
and hence you could safely use on_reboot="destroy" in that case to
mitigate a compromised driver domain from exploiting this
vulnerability.

Roger.