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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [PATCH 04/17] x86/PV: harden guest memory accesses against speculative abuse
On 09.02.2021 17:26, Roger Pau Monné wrote:
> On Thu, Jan 14, 2021 at 04:04:57PM +0100, Jan Beulich wrote:
>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/usercopy.c
>> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/usercopy.c
>> @@ -10,12 +10,19 @@
>> #include <xen/sched.h>
>> #include <asm/uaccess.h>
>>
>> -unsigned __copy_to_user_ll(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned n)
>> +#ifndef GUARD
>> +# define GUARD UA_KEEP
>> +#endif
>> +
>> +unsigned int copy_to_guest_ll(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned
>> int n)
>> {
>> unsigned dummy;
>>
>> stac();
>> asm volatile (
>> + GUARD(
>> + " guest_access_mask_ptr %[to], %q[scratch1], %q[scratch2]\n"
>
> Don't you need to also take 'n' into account here to assert that the
> address doesn't end in hypervisor address space? Or that's fine as
> speculation wouldn't go that far?
Like elsewhere this leverages that the hypervisor VA range starts
immediately after the non-canonical hole. I'm unaware of
speculation being able to cross over that hole.
> I also wonder why this needs to be done in assembly, could you check
> the address(es) using C?
For this to be efficient (in avoiding speculation) the insn
sequence would better not have any conditional jumps. I don't
think the compiler can be told so.
>> --- a/xen/include/asm-x86/uaccess.h
>> +++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/uaccess.h
>> @@ -13,13 +13,19 @@
>> unsigned copy_to_user(void *to, const void *from, unsigned len);
>> unsigned clear_user(void *to, unsigned len);
>> unsigned copy_from_user(void *to, const void *from, unsigned len);
>> +
>> /* Handles exceptions in both to and from, but doesn't do access_ok */
>> -unsigned __copy_to_user_ll(void __user*to, const void *from, unsigned n);
>> -unsigned __copy_from_user_ll(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned n);
>> +unsigned int copy_to_guest_ll(void __user*to, const void *from, unsigned
>> int n);
>> +unsigned int copy_from_guest_ll(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned
>> int n);
>> +unsigned int copy_to_unsafe_ll(void *to, const void *from, unsigned int n);
>> +unsigned int copy_from_unsafe_ll(void *to, const void *from, unsigned int
>> n);
>>
>> extern long __get_user_bad(void);
>> extern void __put_user_bad(void);
>>
>> +#define UA_KEEP(args...) args
>> +#define UA_DROP(args...)
>
> I assume UA means user access, and since you have dropped other uses
> of user and changed to guest instead I wonder if we should name this
> just A_{KEEP/DROP}.
Like in the name of the file I mean to see 'u' stand for "unsafe"
going forward. (A single letter name prefix would also seem more
prone to future collisions to me.)
Jan
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