[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [PATCH v3 for-4.15] x86/msr: introduce an option for compatible MSR behavior selection
Roger Pau Monne writes ("[PATCH v3 for-4.15] x86/msr: introduce an option for compatible MSR behavior selection"): > Introduce an option to allow selecting a behavior similar to the pre > Xen 4.15 one for accesses to MSRs not explicitly handled. Since commit > 84e848fd7a162f669 and 322ec7c89f6640e accesses to MSRs not explicitly > handled by Xen result in the injection of a #GP to the guest. This > is a behavior change since previously a #GP was only injected if > accessing the MSR on the real hardware would also trigger a #GP, or if > the attempted to be set bits wouldn't match the hardware values (for > PV). The reasons for not leaking hardware MSR values and injecting a > #GP are fully valid, so the solution proposed here should be > considered a temporary workaround until all the required MSRs are > properly handled. > > This seems to be problematic for some guests, so introduce an option > to fallback to this kind of legacy behavior without leaking the > underlying MSR values to the guest. > > When the option is set, for both PV and HVM don't inject a #GP to the > guest on MSR read if reading the underlying MSR doesn't result in a > #GP, do the same for writes and simply discard the value to be written > on that case. > > Note that for guests restored or migrated from previous Xen versions > the option is enabled by default, in order to keep a compatible > MSR behavior. Such compatibility is done at the libxl layer, to avoid > higher-level toolstacks from having to know the details about this flag. > > Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx> > Acked-by: Christian Lindig <christian.lindig@xxxxxxxxxx> > Reviewed-by: Ian Jackson <iwj@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> > Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> ... > >From a release PoV there are risks of taking this patch, as it touches > several different areas. So it could break MSR handling or domain > creation. I think however we would be able to spot such breakages in > osstest. > > Not taking the patch would put us in an awkward position if people > migrating from < 4.15 find their guests no longer boot (or crash on > migration) on newer Xen versions, hence I think we need to accept the > risk. Thanks. Yes. I agree. Release-Acked-by: Ian Jackson <iwj@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
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