[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [PATCH 0/3] x86: Initial pieces for guest CET support
Some initial pieces for guest support. Everything will currently malfunction for VMs which explicitly opt in to CET_SS/IBT. Still TODO as a minimum: * Teach the pagewalk logic about shadow stack accesses and errors. * Emulator support for the new instructions. WRUSS is an irritating corner case, requiring a change to how we express pagewalk inputs, as user/supervisor is no longer dependent on CPL. * Context switching of U/S_CET state. Recommended way is with XSAVES, except the S_CET has broken sematics - it ends up as a mix of host and guest state, and isn't safe to XRSTOR without editing what the CPU wrote out. The above ought to suffice for getting some XTF testing in place. For general guest support: * In-guest XSAVES support. Windows is the only OS to support CET at the time of writing, and it cross-checks for XSAVES. Linux expected to perform the same cross-check in due course. Stretch features (not for initial support): * Adding EPT/NPT Supervisor Shadow Stack protections into mem_access, so introspection can block aliasing attacks. Andrew Cooper (3): x86/hvm: Introduce experimental guest CET support x86/svm: Enumeration for CET x86/VT-x: Enumeration for CET xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++-- xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c | 1 + xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svmdebug.c | 2 ++ xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c | 6 ++++++ xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/svm/svm.h | 2 ++ xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/svm/vmcb.h | 10 ++++++++-- xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h | 11 ++++++++++- xen/include/public/arch-x86/cpufeatureset.h | 4 ++-- 8 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) -- 2.11.0
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