[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [PATCH 8/8] xen/hvc: replace BUG_ON() with negative return value
Le 13/05/2021 à 12:03, Juergen Gross a écrit : Xen frontends shouldn't BUG() in case of illegal data received from their backends. So replace the BUG_ON()s when reading illegal data from the ring page with negative return values. Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@xxxxxxxx> --- drivers/tty/hvc/hvc_xen.c | 15 +++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/tty/hvc/hvc_xen.c b/drivers/tty/hvc/hvc_xen.c index 92c9a476defc..30d7ffb1e04c 100644 --- a/drivers/tty/hvc/hvc_xen.c +++ b/drivers/tty/hvc/hvc_xen.c @@ -86,6 +86,11 @@ static int __write_console(struct xencons_info *xencons, cons = intf->out_cons; prod = intf->out_prod; mb(); /* update queue values before going on */ + + if (WARN_ONCE((prod - cons) > sizeof(intf->out), + "Illegal ring page indices")) + return -EINVAL; + BUG_ON((prod - cons) > sizeof(intf->out)); Why keep the BUG_ON() ? while ((sent < len) && ((prod - cons) < sizeof(intf->out)))@@ -114,7 +119,10 @@ static int domU_write_console(uint32_t vtermno, const char *data, int len) */ while (len) { int sent = __write_console(cons, data, len); - + + if (sent < 0) + return sent; + data += sent; len -= sent;@@ -138,7 +146,10 @@ static int domU_read_console(uint32_t vtermno, char *buf, int len)cons = intf->in_cons; prod = intf->in_prod; mb(); /* get pointers before reading ring */ - BUG_ON((prod - cons) > sizeof(intf->in)); + + if (WARN_ONCE((prod - cons) > sizeof(intf->in), + "Illegal ring page indices")) + return -EINVAL;while (cons != prod && recv < len)buf[recv++] = intf->in[MASK_XENCONS_IDX(cons++, intf->in)];
|
Lists.xenproject.org is hosted with RackSpace, monitoring our |