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[PATCH 03/16] x86/P2M: drop a few CONFIG_HVM


  • To: "xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx" <xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Mon, 5 Jul 2021 18:06:39 +0200
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  • Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>, Wei Liu <wl@xxxxxxx>, Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx>, George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx>
  • Delivery-date: Mon, 05 Jul 2021 16:06:46 +0000
  • List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xenproject.org>

This is to make it easier to see which parts of p2m.c still aren't HVM-
specific: In one case the conditionals sat in an already guarded region,
while in the other case P2M_AUDIT implies HVM.

Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>

--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
@@ -1584,11 +1584,10 @@ p2m_flush_table_locked(struct p2m_domain
      * when discarding them.
      */
     ASSERT(!p2m_is_hostp2m(p2m));
-#ifdef CONFIG_HVM
-    /* Nested p2m's do not do pod, hence the asserts (and no pod lock)*/
+
+    /* Nested p2m's do not do pod, hence the asserts (and no pod lock) */
     ASSERT(page_list_empty(&p2m->pod.super));
     ASSERT(page_list_empty(&p2m->pod.single));
-#endif
 
     /* No need to flush if it's already empty */
     if ( p2m_is_nestedp2m(p2m) && p2m->np2m_base == P2M_BASE_EADDR )
@@ -2497,7 +2496,6 @@ int p2m_altp2m_propagate_change(struct d
 
     return ret;
 }
-#endif /* CONFIG_HVM */
 
 /*** Audit ***/
 
@@ -2603,8 +2601,6 @@ out_p2m_audit:
 }
 #endif /* P2M_AUDIT */
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_HVM
-
 /*
  * Add frame from foreign domain to target domain's physmap. Similar to
  * XENMAPSPACE_gmfn but the frame is foreign being mapped into current,




 


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