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Re: [PATCH v2 0/3] xen: harden blkfront against malicious backends

On 08.07.21 16:22, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk wrote:
On Thu, Jul 08, 2021 at 02:43:42PM +0200, Juergen Gross wrote:
Xen backends of para-virtualized devices can live in dom0 kernel, dom0
user land, or in a driver domain. This means that a backend might
reside in a less trusted environment than the Xen core components, so
a backend should not be able to do harm to a Xen guest (it can still
mess up I/O data, but it shouldn't be able to e.g. crash a guest by
other means or cause a privilege escalation in the guest).

Unfortunately blkfront in the Linux kernel is fully trusting its
backend. This series is fixing blkfront in this regard.

It was discussed to handle this as a security problem, but the topic
was discussed in public before, so it isn't a real secret.

Wow. This looks like what Marek did .. in 2018!


Yes, seems to have been a similar goal.

Would it be worth crediting Marek?

I'm fine mentioning his patches, but I didn't know of his patches until
having sent out V1 of my series.

I'd be interested in learning why his patches haven't been taken back


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