[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [PATCH v2 03/13] libxenguest: deal with log-dirty op stats overflow
On 05.07.21 17:13, Jan Beulich wrote: In send_memory_live() the precise value the dirty_count struct field gets initialized to doesn't matter much (apart from the triggering of the log message in send_dirty_pages(), see below), but it is important that it not be zero on the first iteration (or else send_dirty_pages() won't get called at all). Saturate the initializer value at the maximum value the field can hold. While there also initialize struct precopy_stats' respective field to a more sane value: We don't really know how many dirty pages there are at that point. In suspend_and_send_dirty() and verify_frames() the local variables don't need initializing at all, as they're only an output from the hypercall which gets invoked first thing. In send_checkpoint_dirty_pfn_list() the local variable can be dropped altogether: It's optional to xc_logdirty_control() and not used anywhere else. Note that in case the clipping actually takes effect, the "Bitmap contained more entries than expected..." log message will trigger. This being just an informational message, I don't think this is overly concerning. Is there any real reason why the width of the stats fields can't be expanded to avoid clipping? This could avoid the need to set the initial value to -1, which seems one of the more controversial changes. Juergen Attachment:
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