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Re: [PATCH v6 1/3] xen/vpci: Move ecam access functions to common code


  • To: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
  • From: Bertrand Marquis <Bertrand.Marquis@xxxxxxx>
  • Date: Fri, 15 Oct 2021 08:20:16 +0000
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  • Cc: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx>, Ian Jackson <iwj@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Paul Durrant <paul@xxxxxxx>, Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>, Wei Liu <wl@xxxxxxx>, "xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx" <xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Julien Grall <julien@xxxxxxx>
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  • Thread-topic: [PATCH v6 1/3] xen/vpci: Move ecam access functions to common code

Hi Jan,

> On 15 Oct 2021, at 09:13, Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> wrote:
> 
> On 15.10.2021 09:37, Bertrand Marquis wrote:
>>> On 15 Oct 2021, at 07:29, Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>> On 14.10.2021 19:09, Bertrand Marquis wrote:
>>>>> On 14 Oct 2021, at 17:06, Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>>>> On 14.10.2021 16:49, Bertrand Marquis wrote:
>>>>>> @@ -305,7 +291,7 @@ static int vpci_portio_read(const struct 
>>>>>> hvm_io_handler *handler,
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>   reg = hvm_pci_decode_addr(cf8, addr, &sbdf);
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> -    if ( !vpci_access_allowed(reg, size) )
>>>>>> +    if ( !vpci_ecam_access_allowed(reg, size) )
>>>>>>       return X86EMUL_OKAY;
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>   *data = vpci_read(sbdf, reg, size);
>>>>>> @@ -335,7 +321,7 @@ static int vpci_portio_write(const struct 
>>>>>> hvm_io_handler *handler,
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>   reg = hvm_pci_decode_addr(cf8, addr, &sbdf);
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> -    if ( !vpci_access_allowed(reg, size) )
>>>>>> +    if ( !vpci_ecam_access_allowed(reg, size) )
>>>>>>       return X86EMUL_OKAY;
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>   vpci_write(sbdf, reg, size, data);
>>>>> 
>>>>> Why would port I/O functions call an ECAM helper? And in how far is
>>>>> that helper actually ECAM-specific?
>>>> 
>>>> The function was global before.
>>> 
>>> I'm not objecting to the function being global, but to the "ecam" in
>>> its name.
>> 
>> Adding ecam in the name was a request from Roger.
>> This is just a consequence of this.
> 
> Roger - did you have in mind the uses here when asking for the addition
> of "ecam"?
> 
>> One suggestion here could be to turn vpci_ecam_access_allowed into
>> vpci_access_allowed
> 
> That's what I'm asking for.

Will do

> 
>> and maybe put this into vpci.h as a static inline ?
> 
> I'm not overly fussed here.

Was just a suggestion, I am ok to just rename it and keep it where it is.

> 
>>>>>> @@ -434,25 +420,8 @@ static int vpci_mmcfg_read(struct vcpu *v, unsigned 
>>>>>> long addr,
>>>>>>   reg = vpci_mmcfg_decode_addr(mmcfg, addr, &sbdf);
>>>>>>   read_unlock(&d->arch.hvm.mmcfg_lock);
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> -    if ( !vpci_access_allowed(reg, len) ||
>>>>>> -         (reg + len) > PCI_CFG_SPACE_EXP_SIZE )
>>>>>> -        return X86EMUL_OKAY;
>>>>> 
>>>>> While I assume this earlier behavior is the reason for ...
>>>> 
>>>> Yes :-)
>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> -    /*
>>>>>> -     * According to the PCIe 3.1A specification:
>>>>>> -     *  - Configuration Reads and Writes must usually be DWORD or 
>>>>>> smaller
>>>>>> -     *    in size.
>>>>>> -     *  - Because Root Complex implementations are not required to 
>>>>>> support
>>>>>> -     *    accesses to a RCRB that cross DW boundaries [...] software
>>>>>> -     *    should take care not to cause the generation of such accesses
>>>>>> -     *    when accessing a RCRB unless the Root Complex will support the
>>>>>> -     *    access.
>>>>>> -     *  Xen however supports 8byte accesses by splitting them into two
>>>>>> -     *  4byte accesses.
>>>>>> -     */
>>>>>> -    *data = vpci_read(sbdf, reg, min(4u, len));
>>>>>> -    if ( len == 8 )
>>>>>> -        *data |= (uint64_t)vpci_read(sbdf, reg + 4, 4) << 32;
>>>>>> +    /* Ignore return code */
>>>>>> +    vpci_ecam_mmio_read(sbdf, reg, len, data);
>>>>> 
>>>>> ... the commented-upon ignoring of the return value, I don't think
>>>>> that's a good way to deal with things anymore. Instead I think
>>>>> *data should be written to ~0 upon failure, unless it is intended
>>>>> for vpci_ecam_mmio_read() to take care of that case (in which case
>>>>> I'm not sure I would see why it needs to return an error indicator
>>>>> in the first place).
>>>> 
>>>> I am not sure in the first place why this is actually ignored and just
>>>> returning a -1 value.
>>>> If an access is not right, an exception should be generated to the
>>>> Guest instead.
>>> 
>>> No. That's also not what happens on bare metal, at least not on x86.
>>> Faults cannot be raised for reasons outside of the CPU; such errors
>>> (if these are errors in the first place) need to be dealt with
>>> differently. Signaling an error on the PCI bus would be possible,
>>> but would leave open how that's actually to be dealt with. Instead
>>> bad reads return all ones, while bad writes simply get dropped.
>> 
>> So that behaviour is kept here on x86 and I think as the function is
>> generic it is right for it to return an error here. It is up to the caller to
>> ignore it or not.
>> To make this more generic I could return 0 on success and -EACCESS,
>> the caller would then handle it as he wants.
> 
> I think boolean is sufficient here, but I wouldn't object to errno-
> style return values. All I do object to is int when boolean is meant.

Boolean sounds right as there is only one error case.
I will use that.

> 
>>>>>> +int vpci_ecam_mmio_write(pci_sbdf_t sbdf, unsigned int reg, unsigned 
>>>>>> int len,
>>>>>> +                         unsigned long data)
>>>>>> +{
>>>>>> +    if ( !vpci_ecam_access_allowed(reg, len) ||
>>>>>> +         (reg + len) > PCI_CFG_SPACE_EXP_SIZE )
>>>>>> +        return 0;
>>>>>> +
>>>>>> +    vpci_write(sbdf, reg, min(4u, len), data);
>>>>>> +    if ( len == 8 )
>>>>>> +        vpci_write(sbdf, reg + 4, 4, data >> 32);
>>>>>> +
>>>>>> +    return 1;
>>>>>> +}
>>>>>> +
>>>>>> +int vpci_ecam_mmio_read(pci_sbdf_t sbdf, unsigned int reg, unsigned int 
>>>>>> len,
>>>>>> +                        unsigned long *data)
>>>>>> +{
>>>>>> +    if ( !vpci_ecam_access_allowed(reg, len) ||
>>>>>> +         (reg + len) > PCI_CFG_SPACE_EXP_SIZE )
>>>>>> +        return 0;
>>>>>> +
>>>>>> +    /*
>>>>>> +     * According to the PCIe 3.1A specification:
>>>>>> +     *  - Configuration Reads and Writes must usually be DWORD or 
>>>>>> smaller
>>>>>> +     *    in size.
>>>>>> +     *  - Because Root Complex implementations are not required to 
>>>>>> support
>>>>>> +     *    accesses to a RCRB that cross DW boundaries [...] software
>>>>>> +     *    should take care not to cause the generation of such accesses
>>>>>> +     *    when accessing a RCRB unless the Root Complex will support the
>>>>>> +     *    access.
>>>>>> +     *  Xen however supports 8byte accesses by splitting them into two
>>>>>> +     *  4byte accesses.
>>>>>> +     */
>>>>>> +    *data = vpci_read(sbdf, reg, min(4u, len));
>>>>>> +    if ( len == 8 )
>>>>>> +        *data |= (uint64_t)vpci_read(sbdf, reg + 4, 4) << 32;
>>>>>> +
>>>>>> +    return 1;
>>>>>> +}
>>>>> 
>>>>> Why do these two functions return int/0/1 instead of
>>>>> bool/false/true (assuming, as per above, that them returning non-
>>>>> void is warranted at all)?
>>>> 
>>>> This is what the mmio handlers should return to say that an access
>>>> was ok or not so the function stick to this standard.
>>> 
>>> Sticking to this would be okay if the functions here needed their
>>> address taken, such that they can be installed as hooks for a
>>> more general framework to invoke. The functions, however, only get
>>> called directly. Hence there's no reason to mirror what is in need
>>> of cleaning up elsewhere. I'm sure you're aware there we're in the
>>> (slow going) process of improving which types get used where.
>>> While the functions you refer to may not have undergone such
>>> cleanup yet, we generally expect new code to conform to the new
>>> model.
>> 
>> I am ok to rename those to vpci_ecam_{read/write}.
>> Is it what you want ?
> 
> Yes, that's what I've been asking for, and I just saw Roger requesting
> the same. (I'm a little puzzled about the context though, as you reply
> looks disconnected here.)

Oups sorry.
Anyway if we agree on naming scheme and bool return type I think all
your comments here are covered ?

Cheers
Bertrand

> 
> Jan
> 




 


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