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Re: [PATCH v7 1/5] xen/vpci: Move ecam access functions to common code


  • To: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx>
  • From: Bertrand Marquis <Bertrand.Marquis@xxxxxxx>
  • Date: Fri, 15 Oct 2021 15:09:29 +0000
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  • Thread-topic: [PATCH v7 1/5] xen/vpci: Move ecam access functions to common code

Hi,

> On 15 Oct 2021, at 15:17, Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> 
> On Fri, Oct 15, 2021 at 02:59:18PM +0100, Bertrand Marquis wrote:
>> PCI standard is using ECAM and not MCFG which is coming from ACPI[1].
>> Use ECAM/ecam instead of MCFG in common code and in new functions added
>> in common vpci code by this patch.
>> 
>> Move vpci_access_allowed from arch/x86/hvm/io.c to drivers/vpci/vpci.c.
>> 
>> Create vpci_ecam_{read,write} in drivers/vpci/vpci.c that
>> contains the common code to perform these operations, changed
>> vpci_mmcfg_{read,write} accordingly to make use of these functions.
>> 
>> The vpci_ecam_{read,write} functions are returning false on error and
>> true on success. As the x86 code was previously always returning
>> X86EMUL_OKAY the return code is ignored. A comment has been added in
>> the code to show that this is intentional.
> 
> I still wonder how you plan to propagate those errors back to the
> guest in a proper way, so I'm dubious whether returning a boolean is
> really warranted here, as I don't think raising a CPU fault/abort or
> similar on vpci errors in correct. We will see I guess, and the
> current behavior for x86 is not changed anyway.
> 
>> 
>> Those functions will be used in a following patch inside by arm vpci
>> implementation.
>> 
>> Rename MMCFG_BDF to VPCI_ECAM_BDF and move it to vpci.h.
>> This macro is only used by functions calling vpci_ecam helpers.
>> 
>> No functional change intended with this patch.
>> 
>> [1] https://wiki.osdev.org/PCI_Express
>> 
>> Suggested-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx>
>> Signed-off-by: Bertrand Marquis <bertrand.marquis@xxxxxxx>
> 
> Acked-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx>

Thanks

> 
>> ---
>> Changes in v7:
>> - Rename vpci_ecam_access_allowed to vpci_access_allowed
>> - Rename vpci_ecam_mmio_{read/write} to vpci_ecam_{read/write}
>> - Replace comment in x86/hvm/io.c with one suggested by Roger
>> - Remove 32bit comments and fixes from this patch and move it to the next
>> one to keep only the moving+renaming in this patch
>> - Change return type of vpci_ecam_{read/write} to bool
>> - rename ECAM_BDF to VPCI_ECAM_BDF and move it to vpci.h
>> Changes in v6: Patch added
>> ---
>> xen/arch/x86/hvm/io.c     | 46 ++++-----------------------------
>> xen/drivers/vpci/vpci.c   | 54 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>> xen/include/asm-x86/pci.h |  2 --
>> xen/include/xen/vpci.h    | 12 +++++++++
>> 4 files changed, 71 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-)
>> 
>> diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/io.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/io.c
>> index 046a8eb4ed..eb3c80743e 100644
>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/io.c
>> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/io.c
>> @@ -260,20 +260,6 @@ unsigned int hvm_pci_decode_addr(unsigned int cf8, 
>> unsigned int addr,
>>     return CF8_ADDR_LO(cf8) | (addr & 3);
>> }
>> 
>> -/* Do some sanity checks. */
>> -static bool vpci_access_allowed(unsigned int reg, unsigned int len)
>> -{
>> -    /* Check access size. */
>> -    if ( len != 1 && len != 2 && len != 4 && len != 8 )
>> -        return false;
>> -
>> -    /* Check that access is size aligned. */
>> -    if ( (reg & (len - 1)) )
>> -        return false;
>> -
>> -    return true;
>> -}
>> -
>> /* vPCI config space IO ports handlers (0xcf8/0xcfc). */
>> static bool vpci_portio_accept(const struct hvm_io_handler *handler,
>>                                const ioreq_t *p)
>> @@ -394,7 +380,7 @@ static unsigned int vpci_mmcfg_decode_addr(const struct 
>> hvm_mmcfg *mmcfg,
>>                                            paddr_t addr, pci_sbdf_t *sbdf)
>> {
>>     addr -= mmcfg->addr;
>> -    sbdf->bdf = MMCFG_BDF(addr);
>> +    sbdf->bdf = VCPI_ECAM_BDF(addr);
>>     sbdf->bus += mmcfg->start_bus;
>>     sbdf->seg = mmcfg->segment;
>> 
>> @@ -434,25 +420,8 @@ static int vpci_mmcfg_read(struct vcpu *v, unsigned 
>> long addr,
>>     reg = vpci_mmcfg_decode_addr(mmcfg, addr, &sbdf);
>>     read_unlock(&d->arch.hvm.mmcfg_lock);
>> 
>> -    if ( !vpci_access_allowed(reg, len) ||
>> -         (reg + len) > PCI_CFG_SPACE_EXP_SIZE )
>> -        return X86EMUL_OKAY;
>> -
>> -    /*
>> -     * According to the PCIe 3.1A specification:
>> -     *  - Configuration Reads and Writes must usually be DWORD or smaller
>> -     *    in size.
>> -     *  - Because Root Complex implementations are not required to support
>> -     *    accesses to a RCRB that cross DW boundaries [...] software
>> -     *    should take care not to cause the generation of such accesses
>> -     *    when accessing a RCRB unless the Root Complex will support the
>> -     *    access.
>> -     *  Xen however supports 8byte accesses by splitting them into two
>> -     *  4byte accesses.
>> -     */
>> -    *data = vpci_read(sbdf, reg, min(4u, len));
>> -    if ( len == 8 )
>> -        *data |= (uint64_t)vpci_read(sbdf, reg + 4, 4) << 32;
>> +    /* Failed reads are not propagated to the caller */
>> +    vpci_ecam_read(sbdf, reg, len, data);
>> 
>>     return X86EMUL_OKAY;
>> }
>> @@ -476,13 +445,8 @@ static int vpci_mmcfg_write(struct vcpu *v, unsigned 
>> long addr,
>>     reg = vpci_mmcfg_decode_addr(mmcfg, addr, &sbdf);
>>     read_unlock(&d->arch.hvm.mmcfg_lock);
>> 
>> -    if ( !vpci_access_allowed(reg, len) ||
>> -         (reg + len) > PCI_CFG_SPACE_EXP_SIZE )
>> -        return X86EMUL_OKAY;
>> -
>> -    vpci_write(sbdf, reg, min(4u, len), data);
>> -    if ( len == 8 )
>> -        vpci_write(sbdf, reg + 4, 4, data >> 32);
>> +    /* Failed writes are not propagated to the caller */
>> +    vpci_ecam_write(sbdf, reg, len, data);
>> 
>>     return X86EMUL_OKAY;
>> }
>> diff --git a/xen/drivers/vpci/vpci.c b/xen/drivers/vpci/vpci.c
>> index cbd1bac7fc..ef690f15a9 100644
>> --- a/xen/drivers/vpci/vpci.c
>> +++ b/xen/drivers/vpci/vpci.c
>> @@ -478,6 +478,60 @@ void vpci_write(pci_sbdf_t sbdf, unsigned int reg, 
>> unsigned int size,
>>     spin_unlock(&pdev->vpci->lock);
>> }
>> 
>> +/* Helper function to check an access size and alignment on vpci space. */
>> +bool vpci_access_allowed(unsigned int reg, unsigned int len)
>> +{
>> +    /* Check access size. */
>> +    if ( len != 1 && len != 2 && len != 4 && len != 8 )
>> +        return false;
>> +
>> +    /* Check that access is size aligned. */
>> +    if ( (reg & (len - 1)) )
>> +        return false;
>> +
>> +    return true;
>> +}
>> +
>> +bool vpci_ecam_write(pci_sbdf_t sbdf, unsigned int reg, unsigned int len,
>> +                         unsigned long data)
>> +{
>> +    if ( !vpci_access_allowed(reg, len) ||
>> +         (reg + len) > PCI_CFG_SPACE_EXP_SIZE )
>> +        return false;
>> +
>> +    vpci_write(sbdf, reg, min(4u, len), data);
>> +    if ( len == 8 )
>> +        vpci_write(sbdf, reg + 4, 4, data >> 32);
>> +
>> +    return true;
>> +}
>> +
>> +bool vpci_ecam_read(pci_sbdf_t sbdf, unsigned int reg, unsigned int len,
>> +                        unsigned long *data)
>> +{
>> +    if ( !vpci_access_allowed(reg, len) ||
>> +         (reg + len) > PCI_CFG_SPACE_EXP_SIZE )
>> +        return false;
>> +
>> +    /*
>> +     * According to the PCIe 3.1A specification:
>> +     *  - Configuration Reads and Writes must usually be DWORD or smaller
>> +     *    in size.
>> +     *  - Because Root Complex implementations are not required to support
>> +     *    accesses to a RCRB that cross DW boundaries [...] software
>> +     *    should take care not to cause the generation of such accesses
>> +     *    when accessing a RCRB unless the Root Complex will support the
>> +     *    access.
>> +     *  Xen however supports 8byte accesses by splitting them into two
>> +     *  4byte accesses.
>> +     */
>> +    *data = vpci_read(sbdf, reg, min(4u, len));
>> +    if ( len == 8 )
>> +        *data |= (uint64_t)vpci_read(sbdf, reg + 4, 4) << 32;
>> +
>> +    return true;
>> +}
>> +
>> /*
>>  * Local variables:
>>  * mode: C
>> diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/pci.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/pci.h
>> index edd7c3e71a..443f25347d 100644
>> --- a/xen/include/asm-x86/pci.h
>> +++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/pci.h
>> @@ -6,8 +6,6 @@
>> #define CF8_ADDR_HI(cf8) (  ((cf8) & 0x0f000000) >> 16)
>> #define CF8_ENABLED(cf8) (!!((cf8) & 0x80000000))
>> 
>> -#define MMCFG_BDF(addr)  ( ((addr) & 0x0ffff000) >> 12)
>> -
>> #define IS_SNB_GFX(id) (id == 0x01068086 || id == 0x01168086 \
>>                         || id == 0x01268086 || id == 0x01028086 \
>>                         || id == 0x01128086 || id == 0x01228086 \
>> diff --git a/xen/include/xen/vpci.h b/xen/include/xen/vpci.h
>> index 9f5b5d52e1..d6cf0baf14 100644
>> --- a/xen/include/xen/vpci.h
>> +++ b/xen/include/xen/vpci.h
>> @@ -19,6 +19,8 @@ typedef int vpci_register_init_t(struct pci_dev *dev);
>> #define VPCI_PRIORITY_MIDDLE    "5"
>> #define VPCI_PRIORITY_LOW       "9"
>> 
>> +#define VPCI_ECAM_BDF(addr)     (((addr) & 0x0ffff000) >> 12)
>> +
>> #define REGISTER_VPCI_INIT(x, p)                \
>>   static vpci_register_init_t *const x##_entry  \
>>                __used_section(".data.vpci." p) = x
>> @@ -208,6 +210,16 @@ static inline unsigned int vmsix_entry_nr(const struct 
>> vpci_msix *msix,
>> {
>>     return entry - msix->entries;
>> }
>> +
>> +/* ECAM mmio read/write helpers */
> 
> Nit: comment should likely be below vpci_access_allowed.
> 
>> +bool vpci_access_allowed(unsigned int reg, unsigned int len);
>> +
>> +bool vpci_ecam_write(pci_sbdf_t sbdf, unsigned int reg, unsigned int len,
>> +                         unsigned long data);
>> +
>> +bool vpci_ecam_read(pci_sbdf_t sbdf, unsigned int reg, unsigned int len,
>> +                        unsigned long *data);
> 
> Nit: the lines containing the overflow parameter are not properly
> aligned.

I can send a v8 of this patch to fix those.
I will wait until there are other things on the other patches

Thanks
Bertrand

> 
> Thanks, Roger.


 


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