[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [PATCH] xen/arm: fix SBDF calculation for vPCI MMIO handlers
Hi, Julien! On 27.10.21 20:35, Julien Grall wrote: > Hi Oleksandr, > > On 27/10/2021 09:25, Oleksandr Andrushchenko wrote: >> From: Oleksandr Andrushchenko <oleksandr_andrushchenko@xxxxxxxx> >> >> While in vPCI MMIO trap handlers for the guest PCI host bridge it is not >> enough for SBDF translation to simply call VPCI_ECAM_BDF(info->gpa) as >> the base address may not be aligned in the way that the translation >> always work. If not adjusted with respect to the base address it may not be >> able to properly convert SBDF and crashes: >> >> (XEN) vpci_mmio_read 0000:65:1a.0 reg 8bc gpa e65d08bc > > I can't find a printk() that may output this message. Where does this comes > from? That was a debug print. I shouldn't have used that in the patch description, but probably after "---" to better explain what's happening > > Anyway, IIUC the guest physical address is 0xe65d08bc which, if I am not > mistaken, doesn't belong to the range advertised for GUEST_VPCI_ECAM. This is from dom0 I am working on now. > > IMHO, the stack trace should come from usptream Xen or need some information > to explain how this was reproduced. > >> (XEN) Data Abort Trap. Syndrome=0x6 >> (XEN) Walking Hypervisor VA 0x467a28bc on CPU0 via TTBR 0x00000000481d5000 > I can understnad that if we don't substract GUEST_VPCI_ECAM, we would (in > theory) not get the correct BDF. But... I don't understand how this would > result to a data abort in the hypervisor. > > In fact, I think the vPCI code should be resilient enough to not crash if we > pass the wrong BDF. Well, there is no (?) easy way to validate SBDF. And this could be a problem if we have a misbehaving guest which may force Xen to access the memory beyond that of PCI host bridge > > When there is a data abort in Xen, you should get a stack trace from where > this comes from. Can you paste it here? (XEN) Data Abort Trap. Syndrome=0x6 (XEN) Walking Hypervisor VA 0x467a28bc on CPU0 via TTBR 0x00000000481d5000 (XEN) 0TH[0x0] = 0x00000000481d4f7f (XEN) 1ST[0x1] = 0x00000000481d2f7f (XEN) 2ND[0x33] = 0x0000000000000000 (XEN) CPU0: Unexpected Trap: Data Abort (XEN) ----[ Xen-4.16-unstable arm64 debug=y Not tainted ]---- (XEN) CPU: 0 (XEN) PC: 000000000026d3d4 pci_generic_config_read+0x88/0x9c (XEN) LR: 000000000026d36c (XEN) SP: 000080007ff97c00 (XEN) CPSR: 0000000060400249 MODE:64-bit EL2h (Hypervisor, handler) (XEN) X0: 00000000467a28bc X1: 00000000065d08bc X2: 00000000000008bc (XEN) X3: 000000000000000c X4: 000080007ffc6fd0 X5: 0000000000000000 (XEN) X6: 0000000000000014 X7: ffff800011a58000 X8: ffff0000225a0380 (XEN) X9: 0000000000000000 X10: 0101010101010101 X11: 0000000000000028 (XEN) X12: 0101010101010101 X13: 0000000000000020 X14: ffffffffffffffff (XEN) X15: 0000000000000001 X16: ffff800010da6708 X17: 0000000000000020 (XEN) X18: 0000000000000002 X19: 0000000000000004 X20: 000080007ff97c5c (XEN) X21: 00000000000008bc X22: 00000000000008bc X23: 0000000000000004 (XEN) X24: 0000000000000000 X25: 00000000000008bc X26: 00000000000065d0 (XEN) X27: 000080007ffb9010 X28: 0000000000000000 FP: 000080007ff97c00 (XEN) (XEN) VTCR_EL2: 00000000800a3558 (XEN) VTTBR_EL2: 00010000bffba000 (XEN) (XEN) SCTLR_EL2: 0000000030cd183d (XEN) HCR_EL2: 00000000807c663f (XEN) TTBR0_EL2: 00000000481d5000 (XEN) (XEN) ESR_EL2: 0000000096000006 (XEN) HPFAR_EL2: 0000000000e65d00 (XEN) FAR_EL2: 00000000467a28bc (XEN) [snip] (XEN) Xen call trace: (XEN) [<000000000026d3d4>] pci_generic_config_read+0x88/0x9c (PC) (XEN) [<000000000026d36c>] pci_generic_config_read+0x20/0x9c (LR) (XEN) [<000000000026d2c8>] pci-access.c#pci_config_read+0x60/0x84 (XEN) [<000000000026d4a8>] pci_conf_read32+0x10/0x18 (XEN) [<000000000024dcf8>] vpci.c#vpci_read_hw+0x48/0xb8 (XEN) [<000000000024e3e4>] vpci_read+0xac/0x24c (XEN) [<000000000024e934>] vpci_ecam_read+0x78/0xa8 (XEN) [<000000000026e368>] vpci.c#vpci_mmio_read+0x44/0x7c (XEN) [<0000000000275054>] try_handle_mmio+0x1ec/0x264 (XEN) [<000000000027ea50>] traps.c#do_trap_stage2_abort_guest+0x18c/0x2d8 (XEN) [<000000000027f088>] do_trap_guest_sync+0xf0/0x618 (XEN) [<0000000000269c58>] entry.o#guest_sync_slowpath+0xa4/0xd4 (XEN) (XEN) (XEN) **************************************** (XEN) Panic on CPU 0: (XEN) CPU0: Unexpected Trap: Data Abort (XEN) **************************************** > >> >> Fix this by adjusting the gpa with respect to the host bridge base address >> in a way as it is done for x86. >> >> Fixes: d59168dc05a5 ("xen/arm: Enable the existing x86 virtual PCI support >> for ARM") >> >> Signed-off-by: Oleksandr Andrushchenko <oleksandr_andrushchenko@xxxxxxxx> >> --- >> xen/arch/arm/vpci.c | 4 ++-- >> 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) >> >> diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/vpci.c b/xen/arch/arm/vpci.c >> index 8f40a0dec6d2..23f45386f4b3 100644 >> --- a/xen/arch/arm/vpci.c >> +++ b/xen/arch/arm/vpci.c >> @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ static int vpci_mmio_read(struct vcpu *v, mmio_info_t >> *info, >> unsigned long data; >> /* We ignore segment part and always handle segment 0 */ >> - sbdf.sbdf = VPCI_ECAM_BDF(info->gpa); >> + sbdf.sbdf = VPCI_ECAM_BDF(info->gpa - GUEST_VPCI_ECAM_BASE); > > Looking at the rest of the rest, it seems that > 1) the issue is latent as the bits 0-27 are clear > 2) this will need to be modified to take into account dom0. > > So I would prefer if the base address is passed differently (maybe in priv?) > from the start. This will avoid extra modification that you already plan to > have in a follow-up series. I was thinking about the same, but the future code will use priv for other purpose: static int vpci_mmio_read(struct vcpu *v, mmio_info_t *info, register_t *r, void *p) { struct pci_host_bridge *bridge = p; pci_sbdf_t sbdf; /* data is needed to prevent a pointer cast on 32bit */ unsigned long data; if ( bridge ) { sbdf.sbdf = VPCI_ECAM_BDF(info->gpa - bridge->cfg->phys_addr); sbdf.seg = bridge->segment; } else sbdf.sbdf = VPCI_ECAM_BDF(info->gpa - GUEST_VPCI_ECAM_BASE); > >> if ( vpci_ecam_read(sbdf, ECAM_REG_OFFSET(info->gpa), >> 1U << info->dabt.size, &data) ) >> @@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ static int vpci_mmio_write(struct vcpu *v, mmio_info_t >> *info, >> pci_sbdf_t sbdf; >> /* We ignore segment part and always handle segment 0 */ >> - sbdf.sbdf = VPCI_ECAM_BDF(info->gpa); >> + sbdf.sbdf = VPCI_ECAM_BDF(info->gpa - GUEST_VPCI_ECAM_BASE); >> return vpci_ecam_write(sbdf, ECAM_REG_OFFSET(info->gpa), >> 1U << info->dabt.size, r); >> > > Cheers, > Thank you, Oleksandr
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