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Re: [PATCH] xen/arm: fix SBDF calculation for vPCI MMIO handlers


  • To: Julien Grall <julien@xxxxxxx>, "xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx" <xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • From: Oleksandr Andrushchenko <Oleksandr_Andrushchenko@xxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Thu, 28 Oct 2021 12:09:23 +0000
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  • Cc: "sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx" <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx>, "iwj@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx" <iwj@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Bertrand Marquis <bertrand.marquis@xxxxxxx>, Rahul Singh <rahul.singh@xxxxxxx>, Oleksandr Andrushchenko <Oleksandr_Andrushchenko@xxxxxxxx>
  • Delivery-date: Thu, 28 Oct 2021 12:09:38 +0000
  • List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xenproject.org>
  • Thread-index: AQHXyww6rKHs3LJru0q52eLUia+oNavnHBIAgAE3H4A=
  • Thread-topic: [PATCH] xen/arm: fix SBDF calculation for vPCI MMIO handlers

Hi, Julien!

On 27.10.21 20:35, Julien Grall wrote:
> Hi Oleksandr,
>
> On 27/10/2021 09:25, Oleksandr Andrushchenko wrote:
>> From: Oleksandr Andrushchenko <oleksandr_andrushchenko@xxxxxxxx>
>>
>> While in vPCI MMIO trap handlers for the guest PCI host bridge it is not
>> enough for SBDF translation to simply call VPCI_ECAM_BDF(info->gpa) as
>> the base address may not be aligned in the way that the translation
>> always work. If not adjusted with respect to the base address it may not be
>> able to properly convert SBDF and crashes:
>>
>> (XEN) vpci_mmio_read 0000:65:1a.0 reg 8bc gpa e65d08bc
>
> I can't find a printk() that may output this message. Where does this comes 
> from?
That was a debug print. I shouldn't have used that in the patch description, but
probably after "---" to better explain what's happening
>
> Anyway, IIUC the guest physical address is 0xe65d08bc which, if I am not 
> mistaken, doesn't belong to the range advertised for GUEST_VPCI_ECAM.
This is from dom0 I am working on now.
>
> IMHO, the stack trace should come from usptream Xen or need some information 
> to explain how this was reproduced.
>
>> (XEN) Data Abort Trap. Syndrome=0x6
>> (XEN) Walking Hypervisor VA 0x467a28bc on CPU0 via TTBR 0x00000000481d5000
> I can understnad that if we don't substract GUEST_VPCI_ECAM, we would (in 
> theory) not get the correct BDF. But... I don't understand how this would 
> result to a data abort in the hypervisor.
>
> In fact, I think the vPCI code should be resilient enough to not crash if we 
> pass the wrong BDF.
Well, there is no (?) easy way to validate SBDF. And this could be a problem if 
we have a misbehaving
guest which may force Xen to access the memory beyond that of PCI host bridge
>
> When there is a data abort in Xen, you should get a stack trace from where 
> this comes from. Can you paste it here?
(XEN) Data Abort Trap. Syndrome=0x6
(XEN) Walking Hypervisor VA 0x467a28bc on CPU0 via TTBR 0x00000000481d5000
(XEN) 0TH[0x0] = 0x00000000481d4f7f
(XEN) 1ST[0x1] = 0x00000000481d2f7f
(XEN) 2ND[0x33] = 0x0000000000000000
(XEN) CPU0: Unexpected Trap: Data Abort
(XEN) ----[ Xen-4.16-unstable  arm64  debug=y  Not tainted ]----
(XEN) CPU:    0
(XEN) PC:     000000000026d3d4 pci_generic_config_read+0x88/0x9c
(XEN) LR:     000000000026d36c
(XEN) SP:     000080007ff97c00
(XEN) CPSR:   0000000060400249 MODE:64-bit EL2h (Hypervisor, handler)
(XEN)      X0: 00000000467a28bc  X1: 00000000065d08bc  X2: 00000000000008bc
(XEN)      X3: 000000000000000c  X4: 000080007ffc6fd0  X5: 0000000000000000
(XEN)      X6: 0000000000000014  X7: ffff800011a58000  X8: ffff0000225a0380
(XEN)      X9: 0000000000000000 X10: 0101010101010101 X11: 0000000000000028
(XEN)     X12: 0101010101010101 X13: 0000000000000020 X14: ffffffffffffffff
(XEN)     X15: 0000000000000001 X16: ffff800010da6708 X17: 0000000000000020
(XEN)     X18: 0000000000000002 X19: 0000000000000004 X20: 000080007ff97c5c
(XEN)     X21: 00000000000008bc X22: 00000000000008bc X23: 0000000000000004
(XEN)     X24: 0000000000000000 X25: 00000000000008bc X26: 00000000000065d0
(XEN)     X27: 000080007ffb9010 X28: 0000000000000000  FP: 000080007ff97c00
(XEN)
(XEN)   VTCR_EL2: 00000000800a3558
(XEN)  VTTBR_EL2: 00010000bffba000
(XEN)
(XEN)  SCTLR_EL2: 0000000030cd183d
(XEN)    HCR_EL2: 00000000807c663f
(XEN)  TTBR0_EL2: 00000000481d5000
(XEN)
(XEN)    ESR_EL2: 0000000096000006
(XEN)  HPFAR_EL2: 0000000000e65d00
(XEN)    FAR_EL2: 00000000467a28bc
(XEN)
[snip]
(XEN) Xen call trace:
(XEN)    [<000000000026d3d4>] pci_generic_config_read+0x88/0x9c (PC)
(XEN)    [<000000000026d36c>] pci_generic_config_read+0x20/0x9c (LR)
(XEN)    [<000000000026d2c8>] pci-access.c#pci_config_read+0x60/0x84
(XEN)    [<000000000026d4a8>] pci_conf_read32+0x10/0x18
(XEN)    [<000000000024dcf8>] vpci.c#vpci_read_hw+0x48/0xb8
(XEN)    [<000000000024e3e4>] vpci_read+0xac/0x24c
(XEN)    [<000000000024e934>] vpci_ecam_read+0x78/0xa8
(XEN)    [<000000000026e368>] vpci.c#vpci_mmio_read+0x44/0x7c
(XEN)    [<0000000000275054>] try_handle_mmio+0x1ec/0x264
(XEN)    [<000000000027ea50>] traps.c#do_trap_stage2_abort_guest+0x18c/0x2d8
(XEN)    [<000000000027f088>] do_trap_guest_sync+0xf0/0x618
(XEN)    [<0000000000269c58>] entry.o#guest_sync_slowpath+0xa4/0xd4
(XEN)
(XEN)
(XEN) ****************************************
(XEN) Panic on CPU 0:
(XEN) CPU0: Unexpected Trap: Data Abort
(XEN) ****************************************

>
>>
>> Fix this by adjusting the gpa with respect to the host bridge base address
>> in a way as it is done for x86.
>>
>> Fixes: d59168dc05a5 ("xen/arm: Enable the existing x86 virtual PCI support 
>> for ARM")
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Oleksandr Andrushchenko <oleksandr_andrushchenko@xxxxxxxx>
>> ---
>>   xen/arch/arm/vpci.c | 4 ++--
>>   1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/vpci.c b/xen/arch/arm/vpci.c
>> index 8f40a0dec6d2..23f45386f4b3 100644
>> --- a/xen/arch/arm/vpci.c
>> +++ b/xen/arch/arm/vpci.c
>> @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ static int vpci_mmio_read(struct vcpu *v, mmio_info_t 
>> *info,
>>       unsigned long data;
>>         /* We ignore segment part and always handle segment 0 */
>> -    sbdf.sbdf = VPCI_ECAM_BDF(info->gpa);
>> +    sbdf.sbdf = VPCI_ECAM_BDF(info->gpa - GUEST_VPCI_ECAM_BASE);
>
> Looking at the rest of the rest, it seems that
>  1) the issue is latent as the bits 0-27 are clear
>  2) this will need to be modified to take into account dom0.
>
> So I would prefer if the base address is passed differently (maybe in priv?) 
> from the start. This will avoid extra modification that you already plan to 
> have in a follow-up series.
I was thinking about the same, but the future code will use priv for other 
purpose:

static int vpci_mmio_read(struct vcpu *v, mmio_info_t *info,
                           register_t *r, void *p)
{
     struct pci_host_bridge *bridge = p;
     pci_sbdf_t sbdf;
     /* data is needed to prevent a pointer cast on 32bit */
     unsigned long data;

     if ( bridge )
     {
         sbdf.sbdf = VPCI_ECAM_BDF(info->gpa - bridge->cfg->phys_addr);
         sbdf.seg = bridge->segment;
     }
     else
         sbdf.sbdf = VPCI_ECAM_BDF(info->gpa - GUEST_VPCI_ECAM_BASE);

>
>>         if ( vpci_ecam_read(sbdf, ECAM_REG_OFFSET(info->gpa),
>>                           1U << info->dabt.size, &data) )
>> @@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ static int vpci_mmio_write(struct vcpu *v, mmio_info_t 
>> *info,
>>       pci_sbdf_t sbdf;
>>         /* We ignore segment part and always handle segment 0 */
>> -    sbdf.sbdf = VPCI_ECAM_BDF(info->gpa);
>> +    sbdf.sbdf = VPCI_ECAM_BDF(info->gpa - GUEST_VPCI_ECAM_BASE);
>>         return vpci_ecam_write(sbdf, ECAM_REG_OFFSET(info->gpa),
>>                              1U << info->dabt.size, r);
>>
>
> Cheers,
>
Thank you,
Oleksandr

 


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