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Re: [PATCH v2 7/7] x86/vpmu: Harden indirect branches


  • To: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
  • From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2022 14:14:22 +0100
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  • Cc: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx>, Wei Liu <wl@xxxxxxx>, Xen-devel <xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • Delivery-date: Mon, 14 Feb 2022 13:14:29 +0000
  • List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xenproject.org>

On 14.02.2022 13:56, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> As all function pointer calls are resoved to direct calls on boot, clobber the
> endbr64 instructions too to make life harder for an attacker which has managed
> to hijack a function pointer.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>

Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>




 


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