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[PATCH 0/3] x86/hvm: PIRQ related cleanup and a fix
- To: <xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- From: Roger Pau Monne <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Thu, 3 Mar 2022 11:30:54 +0100
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- Cc: Roger Pau Monne <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx>, Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>, George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx>, Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>, Julien Grall <julien@xxxxxxx>, Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx>, Wei Liu <wl@xxxxxxx>
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- List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xenproject.org>
Hello,
First two patches are cleanup related to the usage of PIRQs from HVM
guests, and shouldn't result in any functional change.
Patch 3 allows the usage of PHYSDEVOP_{un,}map_pirq for HVM control
domains even when lacking support to route PIRQs over event channels.
This is done in order to allow setup of device interrupts assigned to
different guests for passthrough support. Note that using passthrough
from a PVH dom0 with vPCI in a safe way will at least require proper
locking around PCI devices, and likely other fixes.
Roger Pau Monne (3):
evtchn/hvm: do not allow binding PIRQs unless supported
hvm/irq: tighten check in hvm_domain_use_pirq
hvm/pirq: allow control domains usage of PHYSDEVOP_{un,}map_pirq
xen/arch/x86/hvm/hypercall.c | 7 +++++++
xen/arch/x86/hvm/irq.c | 2 +-
xen/common/event_channel.c | 2 +-
3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--
2.34.1
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