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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [PATCH] x86/cet: Remove writeable mapping of the BSPs shadow stack
An unintended consequence of the BSP using cpu0_stack[] is that writeable
mappings to the BSPs shadow stacks are retained in the bss. This renders
CET-SS almost useless, as an attacker can update both return addresses and the
ret will not fault.
We specifically don't want the shatter the superpage mapping .data/.bss, so
the only way to fix this is to not have the BSP stack in the main Xen image.
Break cpu_alloc_stack() out of cpu_smpboot_alloc(), and dynamically allocate
the BSP stack as early as reasonable in __start_xen(). As a consequence,
there is no need to delay the BSP's memguard_guard_stack() call.
Copy the top of cpu info block just before switching to use the new stack.
Fix a latent bug by setting %rsp to info->guest_cpu_user_regs rather than
->es; this would be buggy if reinit_bsp_stack() called schedule() (which
rewrites the GPR block) directly, but luckily it doesn't.
Finally, move cpu0_stack[] into .init, so it can be reclaimed after boot.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
CC: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@xxxxxxxx>
CC: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx>
CC: Wei Liu <wl@xxxxxxx>
CC: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <marmarek@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
xen/arch/x86/include/asm/smp.h | 2 ++
xen/arch/x86/setup.c | 20 +++++++++++++-------
xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c | 26 +++++++++++++++++++-------
xen/arch/x86/xen.lds.S | 4 ++--
4 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/smp.h b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/smp.h
index 1747772d232e..41a3b6a0dadf 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/smp.h
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/smp.h
@@ -85,6 +85,8 @@ extern cpumask_t **socket_cpumask;
extern unsigned int disabled_cpus;
extern bool unaccounted_cpus;
+void *cpu_alloc_stack(unsigned int cpu);
+
#endif /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */
#endif
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/setup.c b/xen/arch/x86/setup.c
index 22a9885dee5c..1f816ce05a07 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/setup.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/setup.c
@@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ cpumask_t __read_mostly cpu_present_map;
unsigned long __read_mostly xen_phys_start;
-char __section(".bss.stack_aligned") __aligned(STACK_SIZE)
+char __section("init.bss.stack_aligned") __aligned(STACK_SIZE)
cpu0_stack[STACK_SIZE];
/* Used by the BSP/AP paths to find the higher half stack mapping to use. */
@@ -712,7 +712,6 @@ static void __init noreturn reinit_bsp_stack(void)
percpu_traps_init();
stack_base[0] = stack;
- memguard_guard_stack(stack);
rc = setup_cpu_root_pgt(0);
if ( rc )
@@ -886,6 +885,8 @@ void __init noreturn __start_xen(unsigned long mbi_p)
{
char *memmap_type = NULL;
char *cmdline, *kextra, *loader;
+ void *bsp_stack;
+ struct cpu_info *info = get_cpu_info(), *bsp_info;
unsigned int initrdidx, num_parked = 0;
multiboot_info_t *mbi;
module_t *mod;
@@ -918,7 +919,7 @@ void __init noreturn __start_xen(unsigned long mbi_p)
/* Full exception support from here on in. */
rdmsrl(MSR_EFER, this_cpu(efer));
- asm volatile ( "mov %%cr4,%0" : "=r" (get_cpu_info()->cr4) );
+ asm volatile ( "mov %%cr4,%0" : "=r" (info->cr4) );
/* Enable NMIs. Our loader (e.g. Tboot) may have left them disabled. */
enable_nmis();
@@ -1703,6 +1704,10 @@ void __init noreturn __start_xen(unsigned long mbi_p)
*/
vm_init();
+ bsp_stack = cpu_alloc_stack(0);
+ if ( !bsp_stack )
+ panic("No memory for BSP stack\n");
+
console_init_ring();
vesa_init();
@@ -1974,17 +1979,18 @@ void __init noreturn __start_xen(unsigned long mbi_p)
if ( bsp_delay_spec_ctrl )
{
- struct cpu_info *info = get_cpu_info();
-
info->spec_ctrl_flags &= ~SCF_use_shadow;
barrier();
wrmsrl(MSR_SPEC_CTRL, default_xen_spec_ctrl);
info->last_spec_ctrl = default_xen_spec_ctrl;
}
- /* Jump to the 1:1 virtual mappings of cpu0_stack. */
+ /* Copy the cpu info block, and move onto the BSP stack. */
+ bsp_info = get_cpu_info_from_stack((unsigned long)bsp_stack);
+ *bsp_info = *info;
+
asm volatile ("mov %[stk], %%rsp; jmp %c[fn]" ::
- [stk] "g" (__va(__pa(get_stack_bottom()))),
+ [stk] "g" (&bsp_info->guest_cpu_user_regs),
[fn] "i" (reinit_bsp_stack) : "memory");
unreachable();
}
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c b/xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c
index 709704d71ada..b46fd9ab18e4 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c
@@ -1023,6 +1023,23 @@ static void cpu_smpboot_free(unsigned int cpu, bool
remove)
}
}
+void *cpu_alloc_stack(unsigned int cpu)
+{
+ nodeid_t node = cpu_to_node(cpu);
+ unsigned int memflags = 0;
+ void *stack;
+
+ if ( node != NUMA_NO_NODE )
+ memflags = MEMF_node(node);
+
+ stack = alloc_xenheap_pages(STACK_ORDER, memflags);
+
+ if ( stack )
+ memguard_guard_stack(stack);
+
+ return stack;
+}
+
static int cpu_smpboot_alloc(unsigned int cpu)
{
struct cpu_info *info;
@@ -1035,15 +1052,10 @@ static int cpu_smpboot_alloc(unsigned int cpu)
if ( node != NUMA_NO_NODE )
memflags = MEMF_node(node);
- if ( stack_base[cpu] == NULL )
- {
- stack_base[cpu] = alloc_xenheap_pages(STACK_ORDER, memflags);
- if ( !stack_base[cpu] )
+ if ( stack_base[cpu] == NULL &&
+ (stack_base[cpu] = cpu_alloc_stack(cpu)) == NULL )
goto out;
- memguard_guard_stack(stack_base[cpu]);
- }
-
info = get_cpu_info_from_stack((unsigned long)stack_base[cpu]);
info->processor_id = cpu;
info->per_cpu_offset = __per_cpu_offset[cpu];
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/xen.lds.S b/xen/arch/x86/xen.lds.S
index 4103763f6391..9cd4fe417e14 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/xen.lds.S
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/xen.lds.S
@@ -215,8 +215,9 @@ SECTIONS
} PHDR(text)
DECL_SECTION(.init.data) {
#endif
+ . = ALIGN(STACK_SIZE);
+ *(.init.bss.stack_aligned)
- . = ALIGN(POINTER_ALIGN);
__initdata_cf_clobber_start = .;
*(.init.data.cf_clobber)
*(.init.rodata.cf_clobber)
@@ -300,7 +301,6 @@ SECTIONS
DECL_SECTION(.bss) {
__bss_start = .;
- *(.bss.stack_aligned)
*(.bss.page_aligned*)
. = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE);
__per_cpu_start = .;
--
2.11.0
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