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Re: Security support status of xnf(4) and xbf(4)



On Mon, Mar 28, 2022 at 04:12:29AM +0200, Marek Marczykowski-Górecki wrote:
> On Mon, Mar 28, 2022 at 12:45:24PM +1100, Damien Miller wrote:
> > On Fri, 25 Mar 2022, Demi Marie Obenour wrote:
> > 
> > > Linux’s netfront and blkfront drivers recently had a security
> > > vulnerability (XSA-396) that allowed a malicious backend to potentially
> > > compromise them.  In follow-up audits, I found that OpenBSD’s xnf(4)
> > > currently trusts the backend domain.  I reported this privately to Theo
> > > de Raadt, who indicated that OpenBSD does not consider this to be a
> > > security concern.
> > > 
> > > This is obviously a valid position for the OpenBSD project to take, but
> > > it is surprising to some (such as myself) from the broader Xen
> > > ecosystem.  Standard practice in the Xen world is that bugs in frontends
> > > that allow a malicious backend to cause mischief *are* considered
> > > security bugs unless there is explicit documentation to the contrary.
> > > As such, I believe this deserves to be noted in xnf(4) and xbf(4)’s man
> > > pages.  If the OpenBSD project agrees, I am willing to write a patch,
> > > but I have no experience with mandoc so it might take a few tries.
> > 
> > Hang on, what is a "malicious backend" in this context? Is it something
> > other than the Xen Hypervisor? If not, then it seems not to be a useful
> > attack model, as the hypervisor typically has near-complete access to
> > guests' memory and CPU state.
> 
> No, Xen supports running backends for PV devices in arbitrary domain,

*Yes

> not only dom0. You can read more about it at
> https://wiki.xenproject.org/wiki/Driver_Domain
> See also Andrew's response, Xen is way more disaggregated than KVM.
> 
> Qubes OS makes heavy use of this feature - for example network traffic
> never passes through dom0 (which has no network interfaces at all!). You
> can read more about it at the link below (especially look for the
> diagram at the end, if you want just a quick look):
> https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/architecture/
> 
> -- 
> Best Regards,
> Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
> Invisible Things Lab



-- 
Best Regards,
Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
Invisible Things Lab

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