[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [PATCH 0/2] Introduce XSM ability for domain privilege escalation
This series introduces a pair of functions that allow a domain to be escalated to is_privileged or demoted. Internally the functions enforce the policy that this is only allowed for system domains, the idle domain in particular. As for the implementation, there is a desire that the logic does not persist after __init code is jettison after setup. This has to be balanced with the fact there is no .c unit files for XSM when only the default policy is in use, i.e. CONFIG_XSM is not set. To balance this the functions were implemented as always_inline functions in xsm.h. This should ensure that if the only usage of these functions are in __init code, there should be no instances of this logic present after __init code is jettisoned. Since this introduces the ability to elevate the idle domain to is_privileged, this should not be left in place when transitioning into the running state. As such, a pair of ASSERTs were introduced, one each, for x86 and Arm to ensure that the idle domain isn't inadvertently left with is_privileged being true. Daniel P. Smith (2): xsm: add ability to elevate a domain to privileged arch: ensure idle domain is not left privileged xen/arch/arm/setup.c | 3 +++ xen/arch/x86/setup.c | 3 +++ xen/include/xsm/xsm.h | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 28 insertions(+) -- 2.20.1
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