[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [PATCH 1/2] xsm: add ability to elevate a domain to privileged
Hi Daniel, On 31/03/2022 00:05, Daniel P. Smith wrote: There are now instances where internal hypervisor logic needs to make resource allocation calls that are protected by XSM checks. The internal hypervisor logic is represented a number of system domains which by designed are represented by non-privileged struct domain instances. To enable these logic blocks to function correctly but in a controlled manner, this commit introduces a pair of privilege escalation and demotion functions that will make a system domain privileged and then remove that privilege. Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> --- xen/include/xsm/xsm.h | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+) diff --git a/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h b/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h index e22d6160b5..157e57151e 100644 --- a/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h +++ b/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h @@ -189,6 +189,28 @@ struct xsm_operations { #endif };+static always_inline int xsm_elevate_priv(struct domain *d)+{ + if ( is_system_domain(d) ) + { + d->is_privileged = true; The call for xsm_elevate_priv() cannot be nested. So I would suggest to check if d->is_privileged is already true and return -EBUSY in this case. + return 0; + } + + return -EPERM; +} + +static always_inline int xsm_demote_priv(struct domain *d) +{ + if ( is_system_domain(d) ) + { + d->is_privileged = false; + return 0; + } + + return -EPERM; +} + #ifdef CONFIG_XSMextern struct xsm_operations *xsm_ops; Cheers, -- Julien Grall
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