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Re: [PATCH V1 3/6] xen/virtio: Add option to restrict memory access under Xen



On 24.04.22 20:08, Boris Ostrovsky wrote:

On 4/24/22 12:53 PM, Oleksandr wrote:

On 23.04.22 19:40, Christoph Hellwig wrote:





+
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_RESTRICTED_VIRTIO_MEMORY_ACCESS
+int arch_has_restricted_virtio_memory_access(void)
+{
+    return (xen_has_restricted_virtio_memory_access() ||
+            cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT));
+}
So instead of hardcoding Xen here, this seems like a candidate for
another cc_platform_has flag.


I have a limited knowledge of x86 and Xen on x86.

Would the Xen specific bits fit into Confidential Computing Platform checks? I will let Juergen/Boris comment on this.


This is unrelated to confidential so I don't think we can add another CC_ flag.


Would arch/x86/kernel/cpu/hypervisor.c be a better home for this?

Or a callback in struct struct x86_hyper_runtime maybe?


Juergen

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