[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [PATCH V1 3/6] xen/virtio: Add option to restrict memory access under Xen
On 26.04.22 10:41, Borislav Petkov wrote: On Tue, Apr 26, 2022 at 07:16:16AM +0200, Juergen Gross wrote:Christoph suggested (rather firmly) this would be the way to go.Yeah, I saw it but I don't think it is the right way to go. What happens the next time a guest needs to query the platform underneath? Misuse these interfaces again? Because people will see the Xen use and say, hey, look, I will use this for my funky HV too. Even worse: what happens if Xen decides to implement SEV/TDX? Then you're in for a world of fun. As the suggestion was to add another flag this wouldn't be a problem IMO. But I agree that coco might be not the best way to go (as I wrote already). Now, if we want to *extend* the interfaces to have something as generic as, say, platform_has() and that should be the way for generic kernel code running in the guest to query the platform capabilities, then sure, by all means. I agree. This is needed on guest side at a rather hypervisor independent place. So a capability of some sort seems appropriate. Another suggestion of mine was to have a callback (or flag) in struct x86_hyper_runtime for that purpose.This becomes an issue if the HV is not x86 - then you need a different method of querying it, which then underneath will call the arch-specific interface. I don't know how much of querying guests need to do and how they've been doing that so far. Depending on the requirements, we probably should think about a clean design from the get-go instead of homegrown things. Yes. platform_has() doesn't seem too bad IMO. I will write a patch for starting the discussion. Juergen Attachment:
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