[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [PATCH 2/4] tools: allow vchan XenStore paths more then 64 bytes long
On 09.07.22 12:10, dmitry.semenets@xxxxxxxxx wrote: From: Oleksandr Andrushchenko <oleksandr_andrushchenko@xxxxxxxx> Current vchan implementation, while dealing with XenStore paths, allocates 64 bytes buffer on the stack which may not be enough for some use-cases. Make the buffer longer to respect maximum allowed XenStore path of XENSTORE_ABS_PATH_MAX. Signed-off-by: Oleksandr Andrushchenko <oleksandr_andrushchenko@xxxxxxxx> --- tools/libs/vchan/init.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/libs/vchan/init.c b/tools/libs/vchan/init.c index c6b8674ef5..17945c24a1 100644 --- a/tools/libs/vchan/init.c +++ b/tools/libs/vchan/init.c @@ -249,7 +249,7 @@ static int init_xs_srv(struct libxenvchan *ctrl, int domain, const char* xs_base int ret = -1; struct xs_handle *xs; struct xs_permissions perms[2]; - char buf[64]; + char *buf; char ref[16]; char* domid_str = NULL; xs_transaction_t xs_trans = XBT_NULL; @@ -257,6 +257,12 @@ static int init_xs_srv(struct libxenvchan *ctrl, int domain, const char* xs_base // store the base path so we can clean up on server closure ctrl->xs_path = strdup(xs_base);+ buf = malloc(XENSTORE_ABS_PATH_MAX);+ if (!buf) { + free(ctrl); + return 0; + } + xs = xs_open(0); if (!xs) goto fail; @@ -278,14 +284,14 @@ retry_transaction: goto fail_xs_open;snprintf(ref, sizeof ref, "%d", ring_ref);- snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s/ring-ref", xs_base); + snprintf(buf, XENSTORE_ABS_PATH_MAX, "%s/ring-ref", xs_base); if (!xs_write(xs, xs_trans, buf, ref, strlen(ref))) goto fail_xs_open; if (!xs_set_permissions(xs, xs_trans, buf, perms, 2)) goto fail_xs_open;snprintf(ref, sizeof ref, "%d", ctrl->event_port);- snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s/event-channel", xs_base); + snprintf(buf, XENSTORE_ABS_PATH_MAX, "%s/event-channel", xs_base); if (!xs_write(xs, xs_trans, buf, ref, strlen(ref))) goto fail_xs_open; if (!xs_set_permissions(xs, xs_trans, buf, perms, 2)) @@ -301,6 +307,7 @@ retry_transaction: free(domid_str); xs_close(xs); fail: + free(buf); return ret; }@@ -418,13 +425,20 @@ struct libxenvchan *libxenvchan_client_init(struct xentoollog_logger *logger,{ struct libxenvchan *ctrl = malloc(sizeof(struct libxenvchan)); struct xs_handle *xs = NULL; - char buf[64]; + char *buf; char *ref; int ring_ref; unsigned int len;if (!ctrl)return 0; + + buf = malloc(XENSTORE_ABS_PATH_MAX); + if (!buf) { + free(ctrl); + return 0; + } + ctrl->ring = NULL; ctrl->event = NULL; ctrl->gnttab = NULL; @@ -435,8 +449,9 @@ struct libxenvchan *libxenvchan_client_init(struct xentoollog_logger *logger, if (!xs) goto fail; You are leaking buf in this case. +// find xenstore entry - snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s/ring-ref", xs_path); + snprintf(buf, XENSTORE_ABS_PATH_MAX, "%s/ring-ref", xs_path); ref = xs_read(xs, 0, buf, &len); if (!ref) goto fail; @@ -444,7 +459,7 @@ struct libxenvchan *libxenvchan_client_init(struct xentoollog_logger *logger, free(ref); if (!ring_ref) goto fail; - snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s/event-channel", xs_path); + snprintf(buf, XENSTORE_ABS_PATH_MAX, "%s/event-channel", xs_path); ref = xs_read(xs, 0, buf, &len); if (!ref) goto fail; @@ -474,6 +489,7 @@ struct libxenvchan *libxenvchan_client_init(struct xentoollog_logger *logger, out: if (xs) xs_close(xs); + free(buf); return ctrl; fail: libxenvchan_close(ctrl); Juergen Attachment:
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