[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [PATCH] x86: Add MMIO Stale Data arch_caps to hardware domain
Let the hardware domain know about the hardware it is running on. This allows a linux Dom0 to know that it has the appropriate microcode via FB_CLEAR. /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mmio_stale_data changes from: "Vulnerable: Clear CPU buffers attempted, no microcode; SMT Host state unknown" to: "Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers; SMT Host state unknown" Signed-off-by: Jason Andryuk <jandryuk@xxxxxxxxx> --- Should calculate_host_policy()'s arch_caps mask also be updated? They are not identical today, but I'm don't know this code to understand why they differ. xen/arch/x86/msr.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/msr.c b/xen/arch/x86/msr.c index c2c0025e3a..f1c36d423f 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/msr.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/msr.c @@ -163,7 +163,9 @@ int init_domain_msr_policy(struct domain *d) mp->arch_caps.raw = val & (ARCH_CAPS_RDCL_NO | ARCH_CAPS_IBRS_ALL | ARCH_CAPS_RSBA | - ARCH_CAPS_SSB_NO | ARCH_CAPS_MDS_NO | ARCH_CAPS_TAA_NO); + ARCH_CAPS_SSB_NO | ARCH_CAPS_MDS_NO | ARCH_CAPS_TAA_NO | + ARCH_CAPS_SBDR_SSDP_NO | ARCH_CAPS_FBSDP_NO | ARCH_CAPS_PSDP_NO | + ARCH_CAPS_FB_CLEAR); } d->arch.msr = mp; -- 2.36.1
|
Lists.xenproject.org is hosted with RackSpace, monitoring our |