[PATCH] x86: Expose more MSR_ARCH_CAPS to hwdom

[Jason Andryuk <jandryuk@xxxxxxxxx>]

commit e46474278a0e ("x86/intel: Expose MSR_ARCH_CAPS to dom0") started
exposing MSR_ARCH_CAPS to dom0.  More bits in MSR_ARCH_CAPS have since
been defined, but they haven't been exposed.  Update the list to allow
them through.

As one example, this allows a linux Dom0 to know that it has the
appropriate microcode via FB_CLEAR.  Notably, and with the updated
microcode, this changes dom0's
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mmio_stale_data changes from:
"Vulnerable: Clear CPU buffers attempted, no microcode; SMT Host state
unknown"
to:
"Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers; SMT Host state unknown"

This ecposes the MMIO Stale Data and Intel Branch History Injection
(BHI) controls as well as the page size change MCE issue bit.

Fixes: commit 2ebe8fe9b7e0 ("x86/spec-ctrl: Enumeration for MMIO Stale Data 
controls")
Fixes: commit cea9ae062295 ("x86/spec-ctrl: Enumeration for new Intel BHI 
controls")
Fixes: commit 59e89cdabc71 ("x86/vtx: Disable executable EPT superpages to work 
around CVE-2018-12207")

Signed-off-by: Jason Andryuk <jandryuk@xxxxxxxxx>
---
This is the broader replacement for "x86: Add MMIO Stale Data arch_caps
to hardware domain".

It wasn't discussed previously, but ARCH_CAPS_IF_PSCHANGE_MC_NO is added
as well.

This patch can't be directly backported because cea9ae062295 was not
backported.

 xen/arch/x86/msr.c | 9 +++++++--
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/msr.c b/xen/arch/x86/msr.c
index 6206529162..170f041793 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/msr.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/msr.c
@@ -72,7 +72,9 @@ static void __init calculate_host_policy(void)
     mp->arch_caps.raw &=
         (ARCH_CAPS_RDCL_NO | ARCH_CAPS_IBRS_ALL | ARCH_CAPS_RSBA |
          ARCH_CAPS_SKIP_L1DFL | ARCH_CAPS_SSB_NO | ARCH_CAPS_MDS_NO |
-         ARCH_CAPS_IF_PSCHANGE_MC_NO | ARCH_CAPS_TSX_CTRL | ARCH_CAPS_TAA_NO);
+         ARCH_CAPS_IF_PSCHANGE_MC_NO | ARCH_CAPS_TSX_CTRL | ARCH_CAPS_TAA_NO |
+         ARCH_CAPS_SBDR_SSDP_NO | ARCH_CAPS_FBSDP_NO | ARCH_CAPS_PSDP_NO |
+         ARCH_CAPS_FB_CLEAR | ARCH_CAPS_RRSBA | ARCH_CAPS_BHI_NO);
 }
 
 static void __init calculate_pv_max_policy(void)
@@ -161,7 +163,10 @@ int init_domain_msr_policy(struct domain *d)
 
         mp->arch_caps.raw = val &
             (ARCH_CAPS_RDCL_NO | ARCH_CAPS_IBRS_ALL | ARCH_CAPS_RSBA |
-             ARCH_CAPS_SSB_NO | ARCH_CAPS_MDS_NO | ARCH_CAPS_TAA_NO);
+             ARCH_CAPS_SSB_NO | ARCH_CAPS_MDS_NO | ARCH_CAPS_IF_PSCHANGE_MC_NO 
|
+             ARCH_CAPS_TAA_NO | ARCH_CAPS_SBDR_SSDP_NO | ARCH_CAPS_FBSDP_NO |
+             ARCH_CAPS_PSDP_NO | ARCH_CAPS_FB_CLEAR | ARCH_CAPS_RRSBA |
+             ARCH_CAPS_BHI_NO);
     }
 
     d->arch.msr = mp;
-- 
2.36.1